Daily Papers

Software vulnerabilities are increasing at an alarming rate. However, manual patching is both time-consuming and resource-intensive, while existing automated vulnerability repair (AVR) techniques remain limited in effectiveness. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have opened a new paradigm for AVR, demonstrating remarkable progress. To examine the capability of LLMs in AVR, several vulnerability benchmarks have been proposed recently. However, they still suffer from key limitations of outdated vulnerabilities, limited language coverage, unreliable patch validation, and insufficient reproducibility. To overcome these challenges, we introduce PATCHEVAL, a multilingual benchmark for Go, JavaScript, and Python, languages for which existing benchmarks remain unexplored. PATCHEVAL curates a dataset of 1,000 vulnerabilities drawn from CVEs reported between 2015 and 2025, covering 65 distinct CWEs. A subset of 230 CVEs is further equipped with runtime sandbox environments, enabling patch verification through both security tests and functionality tests. To provide a systematic comparison of LLM-based vulnerability repair, we evaluate a series of state-of-the-art LLMs and agents, presenting an in-depth analysis that empirically yields key insights to guide future research in AVR.

High-quality datasets of real-world vulnerabilities are enormously valuable for downstream research in software security, but existing datasets are typically small, require extensive manual effort to update, and are missing crucial features that such research needs. In this paper, we introduce ARVO: an Atlas of Reproducible Vulnerabilities in Open-source software. By sourcing vulnerabilities from C/C++ projects that Google's OSS-Fuzz discovered and implementing a reliable re-compilation system, we successfully reproduce more than 5,000 memory vulnerabilities across over 250 projects, each with a triggering input, the canonical developer-written patch for fixing the vulnerability, and the ability to automatically rebuild the project from source and run it at its vulnerable and patched revisions. Moreover, our dataset can be automatically updated as OSS-Fuzz finds new vulnerabilities, allowing it to grow over time. We provide a thorough characterization of the ARVO dataset, show that it can locate fixes more accurately than Google's own OSV reproduction effort, and demonstrate its value for future research through two case studies: firstly evaluating real-world LLM-based vulnerability repair, and secondly identifying over 300 falsely patched (still-active) zero-day vulnerabilities from projects improperly labeled by OSS-Fuzz.

Continuous fuzzing platforms such as OSS-Fuzz uncover large numbers of vulnerabilities, yet the subsequent repair process remains largely manual. Unfortunately, existing Automated Vulnerability Repair (AVR) techniques -- including recent LLM-based systems -- are not directly applicable to continuous fuzzing. This is because these systems are designed and evaluated on a static, single-run benchmark setting, making them ill-suited for the diverse, noisy, and failure-prone environments in continuous fuzzing. To address these issues, we introduce PatchIsland, a system for Continuous Vulnerability Repair (CVR) that tightly integrates with continuous fuzzing pipelines. PatchIsland employs an ensemble of diverse LLM agents. By leveraging multiple LLM agents, PatchIsland can cover a wider range of settings (e.g., different projects, bug types, and programming languages) and also improve operational robustness. In addition, PatchIsland utilizes a two-phase patch-based deduplication to mitigate duplicate crashes and patches, which can be problematic in continuous fuzzing. In our internal evaluation, PatchIsland repaired 84 of 92 vulnerabilities, demonstrating strong repair capability. In the official AIxCC competition, the system operated with no human intervention in a fully autonomous environment and successfully patched 31 out of 43 vulnerabilities, achieving a repair rate of 72.1\%.

The increasing use of generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) in modern software engineering, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs) for code generation, has transformed professional software development by boosting productivity and automating development processes. This adoption, however, has highlighted a significant issue: the introduction of security vulnerabilities into the code. These vulnerabilities result, e.g., from flaws in the training data that propagate into the generated code, creating challenges in disclosing them. Traditional vulnerability handling processes often involve extensive manual review. Applying such traditional processes to AI-generated code is challenging. AI-generated code may include several vulnerabilities, possibly in slightly different forms as developers might not build on already implemented code but prompt similar tasks. In this work, we explore the current state of LLM-based approaches for vulnerability handling, focusing on approaches for vulnerability detection, localization, and repair. We provide an overview of recent progress in this area and highlight open challenges that must be addressed in order to establish a reliable and scalable vulnerability handling process of AI-generated code.

In software development, the predominant emphasis on functionality often supersedes security concerns, a trend gaining momentum with AI-driven automation tools like GitHub Copilot. These tools significantly improve developers' efficiency in functional code development. Nevertheless, it remains a notable concern that such tools are also responsible for creating insecure code, predominantly because of pre-training on publicly available repositories with vulnerable code. Moreover, developers are called the "weakest link in the chain" since they have very minimal knowledge of code security. Although existing solutions provide a reasonable solution to vulnerable code, they must adequately describe and educate the developers on code security to ensure that the security issues are not repeated. Therefore we introduce a multipurpose code vulnerability analysis system SecRepair, powered by a large language model, CodeGen2 assisting the developer in identifying and generating fixed code along with a complete description of the vulnerability with a code comment. Our innovative methodology uses a reinforcement learning paradigm to generate code comments augmented by a semantic reward mechanism. Inspired by how humans fix code issues, we propose an instruction-based dataset suitable for vulnerability analysis with LLMs. We further identify zero-day and N-day vulnerabilities in 6 Open Source IoT Operating Systems on GitHub. Our findings underscore that incorporating reinforcement learning coupled with semantic reward augments our model's performance, thereby fortifying its capacity to address code vulnerabilities with improved efficacy.

Although LLMs have shown promising potential in vulnerability detection, this study reveals their limitations in distinguishing between vulnerable and similar-but-benign patched code (only 0.06 - 0.14 accuracy). It shows that LLMs struggle to capture the root causes of vulnerabilities during vulnerability detection. To address this challenge, we propose enhancing LLMs with multi-dimensional vulnerability knowledge distilled from historical vulnerabilities and fixes. We design a novel knowledge-level Retrieval-Augmented Generation framework Vul-RAG, which improves LLMs with an accuracy increase of 16% - 24% in identifying vulnerable and patched code. Additionally, vulnerability knowledge generated by Vul-RAG can further (1) serve as high-quality explanations to improve manual detection accuracy (from 60% to 77%), and (2) detect 10 previously-unknown bugs in the recent Linux kernel release with 6 assigned CVEs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are emerging as transformative tools for software vulnerability detection, addressing critical challenges in the security domain. Traditional methods, such as static and dynamic analysis, often falter due to inefficiencies, high false positive rates, and the growing complexity of modern software systems. By leveraging their ability to analyze code structures, identify patterns, and generate repair suggestions, LLMs, exemplified by models like GPT, BERT, and CodeBERT, present a novel and scalable approach to mitigating vulnerabilities. This paper provides a detailed survey of LLMs in vulnerability detection. It examines key aspects, including model architectures, application methods, target languages, fine-tuning strategies, datasets, and evaluation metrics. We also analyze the scope of current research problems, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches. Further, we address challenges such as cross-language vulnerability detection, multimodal data integration, and repository-level analysis. Based on these findings, we propose solutions for issues like dataset scalability, model interpretability, and applications in low-resource scenarios. Our contributions are threefold: (1) a systematic review of how LLMs are applied in vulnerability detection; (2) an analysis of shared patterns and differences across studies, with a unified framework for understanding the field; and (3) a summary of key challenges and future research directions. This work provides valuable insights for advancing LLM-based vulnerability detection. We also maintain and regularly update latest selected paper on https://github.com/OwenSanzas/LLM-For-Vulnerability-Detection

We propose patching for large language models (LLMs) like software versions, a lightweight and modular approach for addressing safety vulnerabilities. While vendors release improved LLM versions, major releases are costly, infrequent, and difficult to tailor to customer needs, leaving released models with known safety gaps. Unlike full-model fine-tuning or major version updates, our method enables rapid remediation by prepending a compact, learnable prefix to an existing model. This "patch" introduces only 0.003% additional parameters, yet reliably steers model behavior toward that of a safer reference model. Across three critical domains (toxicity mitigation, bias reduction, and harmfulness refusal) policy patches achieve safety improvements comparable to next-generation safety-aligned models while preserving fluency. Our results demonstrate that LLMs can be "patched" much like software, offering vendors and practitioners a practical mechanism for distributing scalable, efficient, and composable safety updates between major model releases.

Automated Program Repair (APR) has evolved significantly with the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs). Fine-tuning LLMs for program repair is a recent avenue of research, with many dimensions which have not been explored. Existing work mostly fine-tunes LLMs with naive code representations and is fundamentally limited in its ability to fine-tune larger LLMs. To address this problem, we propose RepairLLaMA, a novel program repair approach that combines 1) code representations for APR and 2) the state-of-the-art parameter-efficient LLM fine-tuning technique called LoRA. This results in RepairLLaMA producing a highly effective `program repair adapter' for fixing bugs with language models. Our experiments demonstrate the validity of both concepts. First, fine-tuning adapters with program repair specific code representations enables the model to use meaningful repair signals. Second, parameter-efficient fine-tuning helps fine-tuning to converge and contributes to the effectiveness of the repair adapter to fix data-points outside the fine-tuning data distribution. Overall, RepairLLaMA correctly fixes 125 Defects4J v2 and 82 HumanEval-Java bugs, outperforming all baselines.

In this paper, we present the first comprehensive empirical study of specialized LLM-based detectors and compare them with traditional static analyzers at the project scale. Specifically, our study evaluates five latest and representative LLM-based methods and two traditional tools using: 1) an in-house benchmark of 222 known real-world vulnerabilities (C/C++ and Java) to assess detection capability, and 2) 24 active open-source projects, where we manually inspected 385 warnings to assess their practical usability and underlying root causes of failures. Our evaluation yields three key findings: First, while LLM-based detectors exhibit low recall on the in-house benchmark, they still uncover more unique vulnerabilities than traditional tools. Second, in open-source projects, both LLM-based and traditional tools generate substantial warnings but suffer from very high false discovery rates, hindering practical use. Our manual analysis further reveals shallow interprocedural reasoning and misidentified source/sink pairs as primary failure causes, with LLM-based tools exhibiting additional unique failures. Finally, LLM-based methods incurs substantial computational costs-hundreds of thousands to hundreds of millions of tokens and multi-hour to multi-day runtimes. Overall, our findings underscore critical limitations in the robustness, reliability, and scalability of current LLM-based detectors. We ultimately summarize a set of implications for future research toward more effective and practical project-scale vulnerability detection.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise for automated patching, but their effectiveness depends strongly on how they are integrated into patching systems. While prior work explores prompting strategies and individual agent designs, the field lacks a systematic comparison of patching architectures. In this paper, we present a controlled evaluation of four LLM-based patching paradigms -- fixed workflow, single-agent system, multi-agent system, and general-purpose code agents -- using a unified benchmark and evaluation framework. We analyze patch correctness, failure modes, token usage, and execution time across real-world vulnerability tasks. Our results reveal clear architectural trade-offs: fixed workflows are efficient but brittle, single-agent systems balance flexibility and cost, and multi-agent designs improve generalization at the expense of substantially higher overhead and increased risk of reasoning drift on complex tasks. Surprisingly, general-purpose code agents achieve the strongest overall patching performance, benefiting from general-purpose tool interfaces that support effective adaptation across vulnerability types. Overall, we show that architectural design and iteration depth, rather than model capability alone, dominate the reliability and cost of LLM-based automated patching.

Not a day goes by without hearing about the impressive feats of large language models (LLMs), and equally, not a day passes without hearing about their challenges. LLMs are notoriously vulnerable to biases in their dataset, leading to issues such as toxicity. While domain-adaptive training has been employed to mitigate these issues, these techniques often address all model parameters indiscriminately during the repair process, resulting in poor repair quality and reduced model versatility. In this paper, we introduce a novel dynamic slicing-based intent-aware LLM repair strategy, IRepair. This approach selectively targets the most error-prone sections of the model for repair. Specifically, we propose dynamically slicing the model's most sensitive layers that require immediate attention, concentrating repair efforts on those areas. This method enables more effective repairs with potentially less impact on the model's overall performance by altering a smaller portion of the model. We evaluated our technique on three models from the GPT2 and GPT-Neo families, with parameters ranging from 800M to 1.6B, in a toxicity mitigation setup. Our results show that IRepair repairs errors 43.6% more effectively while causing 46% less disruption to general performance compared to the closest baseline, direct preference optimization. Our empirical analysis also reveals that errors are more concentrated in a smaller section of the model, with the top 20% of layers exhibiting 773% more error density than the remaining 80\%. This highlights the need for selective repair. Additionally, we demonstrate that a dynamic selection approach is essential for addressing errors dispersed throughout the model, ensuring a robust and efficient repair.

Program repair techniques offer cost-saving benefits for debugging within software development and programming education scenarios. With the proven effectiveness of Large Language Models (LLMs) in code-related tasks, researchers have explored their potential for program repair. However, it is crucial to recognize that existing repair benchmarks may have influenced LLM training data, potentially causing data leakage. To evaluate LLMs' realistic repair capabilities, (1) we introduce an extensive, non-crawled benchmark, referred to as TutorCode, comprising 1,239 C++ defect codes and associated information such as tutor guidance, solution description, failing test cases, and the corrected code. Our work assesses the repair performance of 12 LLMs on TutorCode, measuring repair correctness (TOP-5 and AVG-5) and patch precision (RPSR). (2) We then provide a comprehensive investigation into which types of extra information can help LLMs improve their performance in repairing defects. Among these types, tutor guidance was found to be the most effective information in enhancing LLM repair capabilities. To fully harness LLMs' conversational capabilities and the benefits of augmented information, (3) we introduce a novel conversational semi-automatic repair framework CREF assisting human tutor. It demonstrates a remarkable AVG-5 improvement of 17.2%-24.6% compared to the baseline, achieving an impressive AVG-5 of 76.6% when utilizing GPT-4. These results highlight the potential for enhancing LLMs' repair capabilities through interactions with tutors and historical conversations involving incorrect responses. The successful application of CREF in a real-world educational setting demonstrates its effectiveness in reducing tutors' workload and improving students' learning experience, while also showcasing its promise for facilitating other software engineering tasks, such as code review.

Security vulnerability repair is a difficult task that is in dire need of automation. Two groups of techniques have shown promise: (1) large code language models (LLMs) that have been pre-trained on source code for tasks such as code completion, and (2) automated program repair (APR) techniques that use deep learning (DL) models to automatically fix software bugs. This paper is the first to study and compare Java vulnerability repair capabilities of LLMs and DL-based APR models. The contributions include that we (1) apply and evaluate five LLMs (Codex, CodeGen, CodeT5, PLBART and InCoder), four fine-tuned LLMs, and four DL-based APR techniques on two real-world Java vulnerability benchmarks (Vul4J and VJBench), (2) design code transformations to address the training and test data overlapping threat to Codex, (3) create a new Java vulnerability repair benchmark VJBench, and its transformed version VJBench-trans and (4) evaluate LLMs and APR techniques on the transformed vulnerabilities in VJBench-trans. Our findings include that (1) existing LLMs and APR models fix very few Java vulnerabilities. Codex fixes 10.2 (20.4%), the most number of vulnerabilities. (2) Fine-tuning with general APR data improves LLMs' vulnerability-fixing capabilities. (3) Our new VJBench reveals that LLMs and APR models fail to fix many Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) types, such as CWE-325 Missing cryptographic step and CWE-444 HTTP request smuggling. (4) Codex still fixes 8.3 transformed vulnerabilities, outperforming all the other LLMs and APR models on transformed vulnerabilities. The results call for innovations to enhance automated Java vulnerability repair such as creating larger vulnerability repair training data, tuning LLMs with such data, and applying code simplification transformation to facilitate vulnerability repair.

With the recent advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs), generating functionally correct code has become less complicated for a wide array of developers. While using LLMs has sped up the functional development process, it poses a heavy risk to code security. Code generation with proper security measures using LLM is a significantly more challenging task than functional code generation. Security measures may include adding a pair of lines of code with the original code, consisting of null pointer checking or prepared statements for SQL injection prevention. Currently, available code repair LLMs generate code repair by supervised fine-tuning, where the model looks at cross-entropy loss. However, the original and repaired codes are mostly similar in functionality and syntactically, except for a few (1-2) lines, which act as security measures. This imbalance between the lines needed for security measures and the functional code enforces the supervised fine-tuned model to prioritize generating functional code without adding proper security measures, which also benefits the model by resulting in minimal loss. Therefore, in this work, for security hardening and strengthening of generated code from LLMs, we propose a reinforcement learning-based method for program-specific repair with the combination of semantic and syntactic reward mechanisms that focus heavily on adding security and functional measures in the code, respectively.

Traditional vulnerability detection methods rely heavily on predefined rule matching, which often fails to capture vulnerabilities accurately. With the rise of large language models (LLMs), leveraging their ability to understand code semantics has emerged as a promising direction for achieving more accurate and efficient vulnerability detection. However, current LLM-based approaches face significant challenges: instability in model outputs, limitations in context length, and hallucination. As a result, many existing solutions either use LLMs merely to enrich predefined rule sets, thereby keeping the detection process fundamentally rule-based, or over-rely on them, leading to poor robustness. To address these challenges, we propose a constraint-solving approach powered by LLMs named VULSOLVER. By modeling vulnerability detection as a constraint-solving problem, and by integrating static application security testing (SAST) with the semantic reasoning capabilities of LLMs, our method enables the LLM to act like a professional human security expert. We assess VULSOLVER on the OWASP Benchmark (1,023 labeled samples), achieving 96.29% accuracy, 96.55% F1-score, and 100% recall. Applied to popular GitHub repositories, VULSOLVER also identified 15 previously unknown high-severity vulnerabilities (CVSS 7.5-9.8), demonstrating its effectiveness in real-world security analysis.

Recent advancements in generative AI have led to the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) in software engineering, addressing numerous long-standing challenges. However, a comprehensive study examining the capabilities of LLMs in software vulnerability detection (SVD), a crucial aspect of software security, is currently lacking. Existing research primarily focuses on evaluating LLMs using C/C++ datasets. It typically explores only one or two strategies among prompt engineering, instruction tuning, and sequence classification fine-tuning for open-source LLMs. Consequently, there is a significant knowledge gap regarding the effectiveness of diverse LLMs in detecting vulnerabilities across various programming languages. To address this knowledge gap, we present a comprehensive empirical study evaluating the performance of LLMs on the SVD task. We have compiled a comprehensive dataset comprising 8,260 vulnerable functions in Python, 7,505 in Java, and 28,983 in JavaScript. We assess five open-source LLMs using multiple approaches, including prompt engineering, instruction tuning, and sequence classification fine-tuning. These LLMs are benchmarked against five fine-tuned small language models and two open-source static application security testing tools. Furthermore, we explore two avenues to improve LLM performance on SVD: a) Data perspective: Retraining models using downsampled balanced datasets. b) Model perspective: Investigating ensemble learning methods that combine predictions from multiple LLMs. Our comprehensive experiments demonstrate that SVD remains a challenging task for LLMs. This study provides a thorough understanding of the role of LLMs in SVD and offers practical insights for future advancements in leveraging generative AI to enhance software security practices.

Security vulnerabilities in modern software are prevalent and harmful. While automated vulnerability detection tools have made promising progress, their scalability and applicability remain challenging. Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs), such as GPT-4 and CodeLlama, have demonstrated remarkable performance on code-related tasks. However, it is unknown whether such LLMs can do complex reasoning over code. In this work, we explore whether pre-trained LLMs can detect security vulnerabilities and address the limitations of existing tools. We evaluate the effectiveness of pre-trained LLMs on a set of five diverse security benchmarks spanning two languages, Java and C/C++, and including code samples from synthetic and real-world projects. We evaluate the effectiveness of LLMs in terms of their performance, explainability, and robustness. By designing a series of effective prompting strategies, we obtain the best results on the synthetic datasets with GPT-4: F1 scores of 0.79 on OWASP, 0.86 on Juliet Java, and 0.89 on Juliet C/C++. Expectedly, the performance of LLMs drops on the more challenging real-world datasets: CVEFixes Java and CVEFixes C/C++, with GPT-4 reporting F1 scores of 0.48 and 0.62, respectively. We show that LLMs can often perform better than existing static analysis and deep learning-based vulnerability detection tools, especially for certain classes of vulnerabilities. Moreover, LLMs also often provide reliable explanations, identifying the vulnerable data flows in code. We find that fine-tuning smaller LLMs can outperform the larger LLMs on synthetic datasets but provide limited gains on real-world datasets. When subjected to adversarial attacks on code, LLMs show mild degradation, with average accuracy reduction of up to 12.67%. Finally, we share our insights and recommendations for future work on leveraging LLMs for vulnerability detection.

Large language models (LLMs) and LLM-based Agents have been applied to fix bugs automatically, demonstrating the capability in addressing software defects by engaging in development environment interaction, iterative validation and code modification. However, systematic analysis of these agent and non-agent systems remain limited, particularly regarding performance variations among top-performing ones. In this paper, we examine seven proprietary and open-source systems on the SWE-bench Lite benchmark for automated bug fixing. We first assess each system's overall performance, noting instances solvable by all or none of these sytems, and explore why some instances are uniquely solved by specific system types. We also compare fault localization accuracy at file and line levels and evaluate bug reproduction capabilities, identifying instances solvable only through dynamic reproduction. Through analysis, we concluded that further optimization is needed in both the LLM itself and the design of Agentic flow to improve the effectiveness of the Agent in bug fixing.

Recently, multiple Automated Program Repair (APR) techniques based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have been proposed to enhance the repair performance. While these techniques mainly focus on the single-line or hunk-level repair, they face significant challenges in real-world application due to the limited repair task scope and costly statement-level fault localization. However, the more practical function-level APR, which broadens the scope of APR task to fix entire buggy functions and requires only cost-efficient function-level fault localization, remains underexplored. In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive study of LLM-based function-level APR including investigating the effect of the few-shot learning mechanism and the auxiliary repair-relevant information. Specifically, we adopt six widely-studied LLMs and construct a benchmark in both the Defects4J 1.2 and 2.0 datasets. Our study demonstrates that LLMs with zero-shot learning are already powerful function-level APR techniques, while applying the few-shot learning mechanism leads to disparate repair performance. Moreover, we find that directly applying the auxiliary repair-relevant information to LLMs significantly increases function-level repair performance. Inspired by our findings, we propose an LLM-based function-level APR technique, namely SRepair, which adopts a dual-LLM framework to leverage the power of the auxiliary repair-relevant information for advancing the repair performance. The evaluation results demonstrate that SRepair can correctly fix 300 single-function bugs in the Defects4J dataset, largely surpassing all previous APR techniques by at least 85%, without the need for the costly statement-level fault location information. Furthermore, SRepair successfully fixes 32 multi-function bugs in the Defects4J dataset, which is the first time achieved by any APR technique ever to our best knowledge.

Large language models (LLMs) have brought significant advancements to code generation and code repair, benefiting both novice and experienced developers. However, their training using unsanitized data from open-source repositories, like GitHub, raises the risk of inadvertently propagating security vulnerabilities. Despite numerous studies investigating the safety of code LLMs, there remains a gap in comprehensively addressing their security features. In this work, we aim to present a comprehensive study aimed at precisely evaluating and enhancing the security aspects of code LLMs. To support our research, we introduce CodeSecEval, a meticulously curated dataset designed to address 44 critical vulnerability types with 180 distinct samples. CodeSecEval serves as the foundation for the automatic evaluation of code models in two crucial tasks: code generation and code repair, with a strong emphasis on security. Our experimental results reveal that current models frequently overlook security issues during both code generation and repair processes, resulting in the creation of vulnerable code. In response, we propose different strategies that leverage vulnerability-aware information and insecure code explanations to mitigate these security vulnerabilities. Furthermore, our findings highlight that certain vulnerability types particularly challenge model performance, influencing their effectiveness in real-world applications. Based on these findings, we believe our study will have a positive impact on the software engineering community, inspiring the development of improved methods for training and utilizing LLMs, thereby leading to safer and more trustworthy model deployment.

Identifying vulnerability-fixing commits corresponding to disclosed CVEs is essential for secure software maintenance but remains challenging at scale, as large repositories contain millions of commits of which only a small fraction address security issues. Existing automated approaches, including traditional machine learning techniques and recent large language model (LLM)-based methods, often suffer from poor precision-recall trade-offs. Frequently evaluated on randomly sampled commits, we uncover that they are substantially underestimating real-world difficulty, where candidate commits are already security-relevant and highly similar. We propose Favia, a forensic, agent-based framework for vulnerability-fix identification that combines scalable candidate ranking with deep and iterative semantic reasoning. Favia first employs an efficient ranking stage to narrow the search space of commits. Each commit is then rigorously evaluated using a ReAct-based LLM agent. By providing the agent with a pre-commit repository as environment, along with specialized tools, the agent tries to localize vulnerable components, navigates the codebase, and establishes causal alignment between code changes and vulnerability root causes. This evidence-driven process enables robust identification of indirect, multi-file, and non-trivial fixes that elude single-pass or similarity-based methods. We evaluate Favia on CVEVC, a large-scale dataset we made that comprises over 8 million commits from 3,708 real-world repositories, and show that it consistently outperforms state-of-the-art traditional and LLM-based baselines under realistic candidate selection, achieving the strongest precision-recall trade-offs and highest F1-scores.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities on a broad spectrum of downstream tasks. Within the realm of software engineering, specialized tasks on code, such as program repair, present unique challenges, necessitating fine-tuning to unlock state-of-the-art performance. Fine-tuning approaches proposed in the literature for LLMs on program repair tasks are however generally overlooking the need to reason about the logic behind code changes, beyond syntactic patterns in the data. High-performing fine-tuning experiments also usually come at very high computational costs. With MORepair, we propose a novel perspective on the learning focus of LLM fine-tuning for program repair: we not only adapt the LLM parameters to the syntactic nuances of the task of code transformation (objective 1), but we also specifically fine-tune the LLM with respect to the logical reason behind the code change in the training data (objective 2). Such a multi-objective fine-tuning will instruct LLMs to generate high-quality patches. We apply MORepair to fine-tune four open-source LLMs with different sizes and architectures. Experimental results on C++ and Java repair benchmarks show that the implemented fine-tuning effectively boosts LLM repair performance by 7.6% to 10% in Top-10 repair suggestions. We further show that our fine-tuning strategy yields superior performance compared to the incumbent state-of-the-art in fine-tuned models for program repair, Fine-tune-CoT and RepairLLaMA.

We propose VulnLLM-R, the~first specialized reasoning LLM for vulnerability detection. Our key insight is that LLMs can reason about program states and analyze the potential vulnerabilities, rather than simple pattern matching. This can improve the model's generalizability and prevent learning shortcuts. However, SOTA reasoning LLMs are typically ultra-large, closed-source, or have limited performance in vulnerability detection. To address this, we propose a novel training recipe with specialized data selection, reasoning data generation, reasoning data filtering and correction, and testing-phase optimization. Using our proposed methodology, we train a reasoning model with seven billion parameters. Through extensive experiments on SOTA datasets across Python, C/C++, and Java, we show that VulnLLM-R has superior effectiveness and efficiency than SOTA static analysis tools and both open-source and commercial large reasoning models. We further conduct a detailed ablation study to validate the key designs in our training recipe. Finally, we construct an agent scaffold around our model and show that it outperforms CodeQL and AFL++ in real-world projects. Our agent further discovers a set of zero-day vulnerabilities in actively maintained repositories. This work represents a pioneering effort to enable real-world, project-level vulnerability detection using AI agents powered by specialized reasoning models. The code is available at~https://github.com/ucsb-mlsec/VulnLLM-R{github}.

Static analysis is a cornerstone for software vulnerability detection, yet it often struggles with the classic precision-scalability trade-off. In practice, such tools often produce high false positive rates, particularly in large codebases like the Linux kernel. This imprecision can arise from simplified vulnerability modeling and over-approximation of path and data constraints. While large language models (LLMs) show promise in code understanding, their naive application to program analysis yields unreliable results due to inherent reasoning limitations. We introduce BugLens, a post-refinement framework that significantly improves static analysis precision. BugLens guides an LLM to follow traditional analysis steps by assessing buggy code patterns for security impact and validating the constraints associated with static warnings. Evaluated on real-world Linux kernel bugs, BugLens raises precision from 0.10 (raw) and 0.50 (semi-automated refinement) to 0.72, substantially reducing false positives and revealing four previously unreported vulnerabilities. Our results suggest that a structured LLM-based workflow can meaningfully enhance the effectiveness of static analysis tools.

Accurate identification of software vulnerabilities is crucial for system integrity. Vulnerability datasets, often derived from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) or directly from GitHub, are essential for training machine learning models to detect these security flaws. However, these datasets frequently suffer from significant noise, typically 40% to 75%, due primarily to the automatic and indiscriminate labeling of all changes in vulnerability-fixing commits (VFCs) as vulnerability-related. This misclassification occurs because not all changes in a commit aimed at fixing vulnerabilities pertain to security threats; many are routine updates like bug fixes or test improvements. This paper introduces the first methodology that uses the Large Language Model (LLM) with a heuristic enhancement to automatically identify vulnerability-fixing changes from VFCs, achieving an F1-score of 0.82. VulSifter was applied to a large-scale study, where we conducted a crawl of 127,063 repositories on GitHub, resulting in the acquisition of 5,352,105 commits. VulSifter involves utilizing an LLM to comprehend code semantics and contextual information, while applying heuristics to filter out unrelated changes. We then developed CleanVul, a high-quality dataset comprising 8,198 functions using our LLM heuristic enhancement approach, demonstrating Correctness (90.6%) comparable to established datasets such as SVEN and PrimeVul. To evaluate the CleanVul dataset, we conducted experiments focusing on fine-tuning various LLMs on CleanVul and other high-quality datasets. Evaluation results reveal that LLMs fine-tuned on CleanVul not only exhibit enhanced accuracy but also superior generalization capabilities compared to those trained on uncleaned datasets. Specifically, models trained on CleanVul and tested on PrimeVul achieve accuracy higher than those trained and tested exclusively on PrimeVul.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown impressive effectiveness in various software engineering tasks, including automated program repair (APR). In this study, we take a deep dive into automated bug fixing utilizing LLMs. In contrast to many deep learning-based APR methods that assume known bug locations, rely on line-level localization tools, or address bug prediction and fixing in one step, our approach uniquely employs LLMs to predict bug location at the token level and subsequently utilizes them for bug fixing. This methodological separation of bug localization and fixing using different LLMs enables effective integration of diverse contextual information and improved incorporation of inductive biases. We introduce Toggle: Token-Granulated Bug Localization and Repair, a comprehensive program repair framework that integrates a bug localization model, an adjustment unit, and a bug-fixing model. Toggle takes a buggy function as input and generates a complete corrected function. We investigate various styles of prompting to the bug fixing model to identify the most effective prompts that better utilize the inductive bias and significantly outperform others. Toggle achieves the new state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance on the CodeXGLUE code refinement benchmark, and exhibits better and comparable performance on several other widely-used APR datasets, including Defects4J.

Large language models (LLMs) are transforming automated program repair (APR) through agent-based approaches that localize bugs, generate patches, and verify fixes. However, the lack of high-quality, scalable training datasets, especially those with verifiable outputs and intermediate reasoning traces-limits progress, particularly for open-source models. In this work, we present SWE-Synth, a framework for synthesizing realistic, verifiable, and process-aware bug-fix datasets at the repository level. SWE-Synth leverages LLM agents to simulate debugging workflows, producing not only bug-fix pairs but also test cases and structured repair trajectories. Compared to manually curated datasets, our method scales with minimal human effort while preserving contextual richness and correctness. Experiments show that models trained on SWE-Synth outperform those trained on real-world datasets by 2.3% on SWE-Bench Lite. Our results highlight the potential of synthetic, agent-generated data to advance the state of the art in APR and software engineering automation.

In this paper we present a novel solution that combines the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) with Formal Verification strategies to verify and automatically repair software vulnerabilities. Initially, we employ Bounded Model Checking (BMC) to locate the software vulnerability and derive a counterexample. The counterexample provides evidence that the system behaves incorrectly or contains a vulnerability. The counterexample that has been detected, along with the source code, are provided to the LLM engine. Our approach involves establishing a specialized prompt language for conducting code debugging and generation to understand the vulnerability's root cause and repair the code. Finally, we use BMC to verify the corrected version of the code generated by the LLM. As a proof of concept, we create ESBMC-AI based on the Efficient SMT-based Context-Bounded Model Checker (ESBMC) and a pre-trained Transformer model, specifically gpt-3.5-turbo, to detect and fix errors in C programs. Our experimentation involved generating a dataset comprising 1000 C code samples, each consisting of 20 to 50 lines of code. Notably, our proposed method achieved an impressive success rate of up to 80% in repairing vulnerable code encompassing buffer overflow and pointer dereference failures. We assert that this automated approach can effectively incorporate into the software development lifecycle's continuous integration and deployment (CI/CD) process.

Sequence-to-sequence models have been used to transform erroneous programs into correct ones when trained with a large enough dataset. Some recent studies also demonstrated strong empirical evidence that code review could improve the program repair further. Large language models, trained with Natural Language (NL) and Programming Language (PL), can contain inherent knowledge of both. In this study, we investigate if this inherent knowledge of PL and NL can be utilized to improve automated program repair. We applied PLBART and CodeT5, two state-of-the-art language models that are pre-trained with both PL and NL, on two such natural language-based program repair datasets and found that the pre-trained language models fine-tuned with datasets containing both code review and subsequent code changes notably outperformed each of the previous models. With the advent of code generative models like Codex and GPT-3.5-Turbo, we also performed zero-shot and few-shots learning-based prompt engineering to assess their performance on these datasets. However, the practical application of using LLMs in the context of automated program repair is still a long way off based on our manual analysis of the generated repaired codes by the learning models.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in code understanding tasks. However, they demonstrate limited performance in vulnerability detection and struggle to distinguish vulnerable code from patched code. We argue that LLMs lack understanding of security specifications -- the expectations about how code should behave to remain safe. When code behavior differs from these expectations, it becomes a potential vulnerability. However, such knowledge is rarely explicit in training data, leaving models unable to reason about security flaws. We propose VulInstruct, a specification-guided approach that systematically extracts security specifications from historical vulnerabilities to detect new ones. VulInstruct constructs a specification knowledge base from two perspectives: (i) General specifications from high-quality patches across projects, capturing fundamental safe behaviors; and (ii) Domain-specific specifications from repeated violations in particular repositories relevant to the target code. VulInstruct retrieves relevant past cases and specifications, enabling LLMs to reason about expected safe behaviors rather than relying on surface patterns. We evaluate VulInstruct under strict criteria requiring both correct predictions and valid reasoning. On PrimeVul, VulInstruct achieves 45.0% F1-score (32.7% improvement) and 37.7% recall (50.8% improvement) compared to baselines, while uniquely detecting 24.3% of vulnerabilities -- 2.4x more than any baseline. In pair-wise evaluation, VulInstruct achieves 32.3% relative improvement. VulInstruct also discovered a previously unknown high-severity vulnerability (CVE-2025-56538) in production code, demonstrating practical value for real-world vulnerability discovery. All code and supplementary materials are available at https://github.com/zhuhaopku/VulInstruct-temp.

Tremendous efforts have been devoted to automating software debugging, a time-consuming process involving fault localization and repair generation. Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown great potential in automated debugging. However, we identified three challenges posed to traditional and LLM-based debugging tools: 1) the upstream imperfection of fault localization affects the downstream repair, 2) the deficiency in handling complex logic errors, and 3) the ignorance of program contexts. In this context, we propose the first automated, unified debugging framework, FixAgent, via LLM agent synergy. FixAgent can perform end-to-end localization, repair, and analysis of bugs. Our insight is that LLMs can benefit from general software engineering principles recognized by human developers in debugging, such as rubber duck debugging, enabling a better understanding of program functionality and logic bugs. Hence, we create three designs inspired by rubber ducking to address these challenges. They are agent specialization and synergy, key variable tracking, and program context comprehension, which request LLMs to provide explicit explanations and force them to focus on crucial program logic information. Experiments on the widely used dataset QuixBugs show that FixAgent correctly fixes 79 out of 80 bugs, 9 of which have never been fixed. It also plausibly patches 1.9X more defects than the best-performing repair tool on CodeFlaws, even with no bug location information and fewer than 0.6% sampling times. On average, FixAgent increases about 20% plausible and correct fixes compared to its base model using different LLMs, showing the effectiveness of our designs. Moreover, the correctness rate of FixAgent reaches remarkably 97.26%, indicating that FixAgent can potentially overcome the overfitting issue of the existing approaches.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable proficiency across a variety of complex tasks. One significant application of LLMs is in tackling software engineering challenges, particularly in resolving real-world tasks on GitHub by fixing code based on the issues reported by the users. However, many current approaches rely on proprietary LLMs, which limits reproducibility, accessibility, and transparency. The critical components of LLMs for addressing software engineering issues and how their capabilities can be effectively enhanced remain unclear. To address these challenges, we introduce SWE-Fixer, a novel open-source LLM designed to effectively and efficiently resolve GitHub issues. SWE-Fixer comprises two essential modules: a code file retrieval module and a code editing module. The retrieval module employs BM25 along with a lightweight LLM model to achieve coarse-to-fine file retrieval. Subsequently, the code editing module utilizes the other LLM model to generate patches for the identified files. Then, to mitigate the lack of publicly available datasets, we compile an extensive dataset that includes 110K GitHub issues along with their corresponding patches, and train the two modules of SWE-Fixer separately. We assess our approach on the SWE-Bench Lite and Verified benchmarks, achieving state-of-the-art performance among open-source models with scores of 23.3% and 30.2%, respectively. These outcomes highlight the efficacy of our approach. We will make our model, dataset, and code publicly available at https://github.com/InternLM/SWE-Fixer.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate code with subtle but critical bugs, especially for complex tasks. Existing automated repair methods typically rely on superficial pass/fail signals, offering limited visibility into program behavior and hindering precise error localization. In addition, without a way to learn from prior failures, repair processes often fall into repetitive and inefficient cycles. To overcome these challenges, we present TraceCoder, a collaborative multi-agent framework that emulates the observe-analyze-repair process of human experts. The framework first instruments the code with diagnostic probes to capture fine-grained runtime traces, enabling deep insight into its internal execution. It then conducts causal analysis on these traces to accurately identify the root cause of the failure. This process is further enhanced by a novel Historical Lesson Learning Mechanism (HLLM), which distills insights from prior failed repair attempts to inform subsequent correction strategies and prevent recurrence of similar mistakes. To ensure stable convergence, a Rollback Mechanism enforces that each repair iteration constitutes a strict improvement toward the correct solution. Comprehensive experiments across multiple benchmarks show that TraceCoder achieves up to a 34.43\% relative improvement in Pass@1 accuracy over existing advanced baselines. Ablation studies verify the significance of each system component, with the iterative repair process alone contributing a 65.61\% relative gain in accuracy. Furthermore, TraceCoder significantly outperforms leading iterative methods in terms of both accuracy and cost-efficiency.

APR (Automated Program Repair) aims to automatically locate program defects, generate patches and validate the repairs. Existing techniques for APR are often combined with LLMs (Large Language Models), which leverages the code-related knowledge of LLMs to improve repair effectiveness. Current LLM-based APR methods typically utilize test cases only during the inference stage, adopting an iterative approach that performs repair first and validates it through test execution afterward. This conventional paradigm neglects two important aspects: the potential contribution of test cases in the training phase, and the possibility of leveraging testing prior to repair. To address this, we propose Repair-R1, which introduces test cases into the model's training phase and shifts test generation to precede repair. The model is required to first generate discriminative test cases that can distinguish defective behaviors, and then perform repair based on these tests. This enables the model to better locate defects and understand the underlying causes of defects, thereby improving repair effectiveness. We implement Repair-R1 with three different backbone models, using RL (reinforcement learning) to co-optimize test generation and bug repair. Experimental results on four widely adopted benchmarks demonstrate the superiority of Repair-R1. Specially, compared to vanilla models, Repair-R1 improves repair success rate by 2.68\% to 48.29\%, test generation success rate by 16.38\% to 53.28\%, and test coverage by 0.78\% to 53.96\%. We publish the code and weights at https://github.com/Tomsawyerhu/APR-RL and https://huggingface.co/tomhu/Qwen3-4B-RL-5000-step.

Automated Program Repair (APR) can help developers automatically generate patches for bugs. Due to the impressive performance obtained using Large Pre-Trained Language Models (LLMs) on many code related tasks, researchers have started to directly use LLMs for APR. However, prior approaches simply repeatedly sample the LLM given the same constructed input/prompt created from the original buggy code, which not only leads to generating the same incorrect patches repeatedly but also miss the critical information in testcases. To address these limitations, we propose conversational APR, a new paradigm for program repair that alternates between patch generation and validation in a conversational manner. In conversational APR, we iteratively build the input to the model by combining previously generated patches with validation feedback. As such, we leverage the long-term context window of LLMs to not only avoid generating previously incorrect patches but also incorporate validation feedback to help the model understand the semantic meaning of the program under test. We evaluate 10 different LLM including the newly developed ChatGPT model to demonstrate the improvement of conversational APR over the prior LLM for APR approach.

In this study, we evaluated the capability of Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly OpenAI's GPT-4, in detecting software vulnerabilities, comparing their performance against traditional static code analyzers like Snyk and Fortify. Our analysis covered numerous repositories, including those from NASA and the Department of Defense. GPT-4 identified approximately four times the vulnerabilities than its counterparts. Furthermore, it provided viable fixes for each vulnerability, demonstrating a low rate of false positives. Our tests encompassed 129 code samples across eight programming languages, revealing the highest vulnerabilities in PHP and JavaScript. GPT-4's code corrections led to a 90% reduction in vulnerabilities, requiring only an 11% increase in code lines. A critical insight was LLMs' ability to self-audit, suggesting fixes for their identified vulnerabilities and underscoring their precision. Future research should explore system-level vulnerabilities and integrate multiple static code analyzers for a holistic perspective on LLMs' potential.

LLMs demonstrate promising performance in software vulnerability detection after fine-tuning. However, it remains unclear whether these gains reflect a genuine understanding of vulnerability root causes or merely an exploitation of functional patterns. In this paper, we identify a critical failure mode termed the "semantic trap," where fine-tuned LLMs achieve high detection scores by associating certain functional domains with vulnerability likelihood rather than reasoning about the underlying security semantics. To systematically evaluate this phenomenon, we propose TrapEval, a comprehensive evaluation framework designed to disentangle vulnerability root cause from functional pattern. TrapEval introduces two complementary datasets derived from real-world open-source projects: V2N, which pairs vulnerable code with unrelated benign code, and V2P, which pairs vulnerable code with its corresponding patched version, forcing models to distinguish near-identical code that differs only in subtle security-critical logic. Using TrapEval, we fine-tune five representative state-of-the-art LLMs across three model families and evaluate them under cross-dataset testing, semantic-preserving perturbations, and varying degrees of semantic gap measured by CodeBLEU. Our empirical results reveal that, despite improvements in metrics, fine-tuned LLMs consistently struggle to distinguish vulnerable code from its patched counterpart, exhibit severe robustness degradation under minor semantic-preserving transformations, and rely heavily on functional-context shortcuts when the semantic gap is small. These findings provide strong evidence that current fine-tuning practices often fail to impart true vulnerability reasoning. Our findings serve as a wake-up call: high benchmark scores on traditional datasets may be illusory, masking the model's inability to understand the true causal logic of vulnerabilities.

Post-training for large language models (LLMs) is constrained by the high cost of acquiring new knowledge or correcting errors and by the unintended side effects that frequently arise from retraining. To address these issues, we introduce REPAIR (Robust Editing via Progressive Adaptive Intervention and Reintegration), a lifelong editing framework designed to support precise and low-cost model updates while preserving non-target knowledge. REPAIR mitigates the instability and conflicts of large-scale sequential edits through a closed-loop feedback mechanism coupled with dynamic memory management. Furthermore, by incorporating frequent knowledge fusion and enforcing strong locality guards, REPAIR effectively addresses the shortcomings of traditional distribution-agnostic approaches that often overlook unintended ripple effects. Our experiments demonstrate that REPAIR boosts editing accuracy by 10%-30% across multiple model families and significantly reduces knowledge forgetting. This work introduces a robust framework for developing reliable, scalable, and continually evolving LLMs.

AI-powered coding assistants such as GitHub Copilot and OpenAI ChatGPT have achieved notable success in automating code generation. However, these tools rely on pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) that are typically trained on human-written code sourced from open-source project hosting sites like GitHub, which often contains inherent security vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities may then be mirrored in the code generated by these LLMs, a critical risk revealed and highlighted by recent empirical studies. In this work, we present an exploratory study on whether fine-tuning pre-trained LLMs on datasets of vulnerability-fixing commits can promote secure code generation. We explored two parameter-efficient fine-tuning techniques (LoRa and IA3) on two pre-trained LLMs for code generation. We crawled a fine-tuning dataset (14,622 C and C++ files) for secure code generation by collecting code fixes of confirmed vulnerabilities from open-source repositories. Our evaluation dataset comprises 52 vulnerability scenarios designed to cover the top most dangerous C and C++ Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs). Each scenario is a prompt that may induce LLMs to generate vulnerable code. Our exploration reveals that fine-tuning LLMs can improve secure code generation by 6.4% in C language and 5.4% in C++ language. We further experimented with fine-tuning LLMs using different versions of the collected secure code dataset (block, function, and line). We found that fine-tuning with function-level and block-level datasets achieves the best secure code generation performance, compared to the alternatives (file-level and line-level).

Access control policies are vital for securing modern cloud computing, where organizations must manage access to sensitive data across thousands of users in distributed system settings. Cloud administrators typically write and update policies manually, which can be an error-prone and time-consuming process and can potentially lead to security vulnerabilities. Existing approaches based on symbolic analysis have demon- strated success in automated debugging and repairing access control policies; however, their generalizability is limited in the context of cloud-based access control. Conversely, Large Language Models (LLMs) have been utilized for automated program repair; however, their applicability to repairing cloud access control policies remains unexplored. In this work, we introduce CloudFix, the first automated policy repair framework for cloud access control that combines formal methods with LLMs. Given an access control policy and a specification of allowed and denied access requests, CloudFix employs Formal Methods-based Fault Localization to identify faulty statements in the policy and leverages LLMs to generate potential repairs, which are then verified using SMT solvers. To evaluate CloudFix, we curated a dataset of 282 real-world AWS access control policies extracted from forum posts and augmented them with synthetically generated request sets based on real scenarios. Our experimental results show that CloudFix improves repair accuracy over a Baseline implementation across varying request sizes. Our work is the first to leverage LLMs for policy repair, showcasing the effectiveness of LLMs for access control and enabling efficient and automated repair of cloud access control policies. We make our tool Cloudfix and AWS dataset publicly available.

Large Language Models (LLMs) struggle to automate real-world vulnerability detection due to two key limitations: the heterogeneity of vulnerability patterns undermines the effectiveness of a single unified model, and manual prompt engineering for massive weakness categories is unscalable. To address these challenges, we propose MulVul, a retrieval-augmented multi-agent framework designed for precise and broad-coverage vulnerability detection. MulVul adopts a coarse-to-fine strategy: a Router agent first predicts the top-k coarse categories and then forwards the input to specialized Detector agents, which identify the exact vulnerability types. Both agents are equipped with retrieval tools to actively source evidence from vulnerability knowledge bases to mitigate hallucinations. Crucially, to automate the generation of specialized prompts, we design Cross-Model Prompt Evolution, a prompt optimization mechanism where a generator LLM iteratively refines candidate prompts while a distinct executor LLM validates their effectiveness. This decoupling mitigates the self-correction bias inherent in single-model optimization. Evaluated on 130 CWE types, MulVul achieves 34.79\% Macro-F1, outperforming the best baseline by 41.5\%. Ablation studies validate cross-model prompt evolution, which boosts performance by 51.6\% over manual prompts by effectively handling diverse vulnerability patterns.

Rigorous security-focused evaluation of large language model (LLM) agents is imperative for establishing trust in their safe deployment throughout the software development lifecycle. However, existing benchmarks largely rely on synthetic challenges or simplified vulnerability datasets that fail to capture the complexity and ambiguity encountered by security engineers in practice. We introduce SEC-bench, the first fully automated benchmarking framework for evaluating LLM agents on authentic security engineering tasks. SEC-bench employs a novel multi-agent scaffold that automatically constructs code repositories with harnesses, reproduces vulnerabilities in isolated environments, and generates gold patches for reliable evaluation. Our framework automatically creates high-quality software vulnerability datasets with reproducible artifacts at a cost of only $0.87 per instance. Using SEC-bench, we implement two critical software security tasks to rigorously evaluate LLM agents' capabilities: proof-of-concept (PoC) generation and vulnerability patching. A comprehensive evaluation of state-of-the-art LLM code agents reveals significant performance gaps, achieving at most 18.0% success in PoC generation and 34.0% in vulnerability patching on our complete dataset. These results highlight the crucial steps needed toward developing LLM agents that are more practical, intelligent, and autonomous for security engineering.

Software security vulnerabilities allow attackers to perform malicious activities to disrupt software operations. Recent Transformer-based language models have significantly advanced vulnerability detection, surpassing the capabilities of static analysis based deep learning models. However, language models trained solely on code tokens do not capture either the explanation of vulnerability type or the data flow structure information of code, both of which are crucial for vulnerability detection. We propose a novel technique that integrates a multitask sequence-to-sequence LLM with pro-gram control flow graphs encoded as a graph neural network to achieve sequence-to-classification vulnerability detection. We introduce MSIVD, multitask self-instructed fine-tuning for vulnerability detection, inspired by chain-of-thought prompting and LLM self-instruction. Our experiments demonstrate that MSIVD achieves superior performance, outperforming the highest LLM-based vulnerability detector baseline (LineVul), with a F1 score of 0.92 on the BigVul dataset, and 0.48 on the PreciseBugs dataset. By training LLMs and GNNs simultaneously using a combination of code and explanatory metrics of a vulnerable program, MSIVD represents a promising direction for advancing LLM-based vulnerability detection that generalizes to unseen data. Based on our findings, we further discuss the necessity for new labelled security vulnerability datasets, as recent LLMs have seen or memorized prior datasets' held-out evaluation data.

Software vulnerabilities bear enterprises significant costs. Despite extensive efforts in research and development of software vulnerability detection methods, uncaught vulnerabilities continue to put software owners and users at risk. Many current vulnerability detection methods require that code snippets can compile and build before attempting detection. This, unfortunately, introduces a long latency between the time a vulnerability is injected to the time it is removed, which can substantially increases the cost of fixing a vulnerability. We recognize that the current advances in machine learning can be used to detect vulnerable code patterns on syntactically incomplete code snippets as the developer is writing the code at EditTime. In this paper we present a practical system that leverages deep learning on a large-scale data set of vulnerable code patterns to learn complex manifestations of more than 250 vulnerability types and detect vulnerable code patterns at EditTime. We discuss zero-shot, few-shot, and fine-tuning approaches on state of the art pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs). We show that in comparison with state of the art vulnerability detection models our approach improves the state of the art by 10%. We also evaluate our approach to detect vulnerability in auto-generated code by code LLMs. Evaluation on a benchmark of high-risk code scenarios shows a reduction of up to 90% vulnerability reduction.

Large language models (LLMs) have brought significant advancements to code generation, benefiting both novice and experienced developers. However, their training using unsanitized data from open-source repositories, like GitHub, introduces the risk of inadvertently propagating security vulnerabilities. To effectively mitigate this concern, this paper presents a comprehensive study focused on evaluating and enhancing code LLMs from a software security perspective. We introduce SecuCoGenSecuCoGen has been uploaded as supplemental material and will be made publicly available after publication., a meticulously curated dataset targeting 21 critical vulnerability types. SecuCoGen comprises 180 samples and serves as the foundation for conducting experiments on three crucial code-related tasks: code generation, code repair and vulnerability classification, with a strong emphasis on security. Our experimental results reveal that existing models often overlook security concerns during code generation, leading to the generation of vulnerable code. To address this, we propose effective approaches to mitigate the security vulnerabilities and enhance the overall robustness of code generated by LLMs. Moreover, our study identifies weaknesses in existing models' ability to repair vulnerable code, even when provided with vulnerability information. Additionally, certain vulnerability types pose challenges for the models, hindering their performance in vulnerability classification. Based on these findings, we believe our study will have a positive impact on the software engineering community, inspiring the development of improved methods for training and utilizing LLMs, thereby leading to safer and more trustworthy model deployment.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly adopted for code vulnerability detection, their reliability and robustness across diverse vulnerability types have become a pressing concern. In traditional adversarial settings, code obfuscation has long been used as a general strategy to bypass auditing tools, preserving exploitability without tampering with the tools themselves. Numerous efforts have explored obfuscation methods and tools, yet their capabilities differ in terms of supported techniques, granularity, and programming languages, making it difficult to systematically assess their impact on LLM-based vulnerability detection. To address this gap, we provide a structured systematization of obfuscation techniques and evaluate them under a unified framework. Specifically, we categorize existing obfuscation methods into three major classes (layout, data flow, and control flow) covering 11 subcategories and 19 concrete techniques. We implement these techniques across four programming languages (Solidity, C, C++, and Python) using a consistent LLM-driven approach, and evaluate their effects on 15 LLMs spanning four model families (DeepSeek, OpenAI, Qwen, and LLaMA), as well as on two coding agents (GitHub Copilot and Codex). Our findings reveal both positive and negative impacts of code obfuscation on LLM-based vulnerability detection, highlighting conditions under which obfuscation leads to performance improvements or degradations. We further analyze these outcomes with respect to vulnerability characteristics, code properties, and model attributes. Finally, we outline several open problems and propose future directions to enhance the robustness of LLMs for real-world vulnerability detection.

Automatically generating source code from natural language using large language models (LLMs) is becoming common, yet security vulnerabilities persist despite advances in fine tuning and prompting. In this work, we systematically evaluate whether multi LLM ensembles and collaborative strategies can meaningfully improve secure code generation. We present MULTI-LLMSECCODEEVAL, a framework for assessing and enhancing security across the vulnerability management lifecycle by combining multiple LLMs with static analysis and structured collaboration. Using SecLLMEval and SecLLMHolmes, we benchmark ten pipelines spanning single model, ensemble, collaborative, and hybrid designs. Our results show that ensemble pipelines augmented with static analysis improve secure code generation over single LLM baselines by up to 47.3% on SecLLMEval and 19.3% on SecLLMHolmes, while purely LLM based collaborative pipelines yield smaller gains of 8.9% to 22.3%. Hybrid pipelines that integrate ensembling, detection, and patching achieve the strongest security performance, outperforming the best ensemble baseline by 1.78% to 4.72% and collaborative baselines by 19.81% to 26.78%. Ablation studies reveal that model scale alone does not ensure security. Smaller, structured multi model ensembles consistently outperform large monolithic LLMs. Overall, our findings demonstrate that secure code does not emerge from scale, but from carefully orchestrated multi model system design.

The integration of LLMs into vulnerability detection (VD) has shifted the field toward interpretable and context-aware analysis. While post-training methods have shown promise in general coding tasks, their systematic application to VD remains underexplored. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive investigation into the post-training pipeline for LLM-based VD, spanning from cold-start SFT to off-policy preference optimization and on-policy RL, uncovering how data curation, stage interactions, reward mechanisms, and evaluation protocols collectively dictate the efficacy of model training and assessment. Our study identifies practical guidelines and insights: (1) SFT based on rejection sampling greatly outperforms rationalization-based supervision, which can introduce hallucinations due to ground-truth leakage. (2) While increased SFT epochs constantly benefit preference optimization, excessive SFT inhibits self-exploration during RL, ultimately limiting performance gains. (3) Coarse-grained reward signals often mislead RL, whereas fine-grained root-cause judgments ensure reliable credit assignment. Specification-based rewards offer further benefits but incur significant effort in specification generation. (4) Although filtering extremely hard-to-detect vulnerability samples improves RL training efficiency, the cost of performance loss should be considered in practical applications. (5) Models trained under GRPO significantly outperform those using SFT and preference optimization (i.e., DPO and ORPO), as well as a series of zero-shot SOTA LLMs, underscoring the significant potential of on-policy RL for LLM-based VD. (6) In contrast to binary matching that tends to overestimate performance, LLM-as-a-Judge based on root-cause analysis provides a more robust evaluation protocol, although its accuracy varies across judge models with different levels of security expertise.

Large language models (LLMs) and LLM-based agents have been widely deployed in a wide range of applications in the real world, including healthcare diagnostics, financial analysis, customer support, robotics, and autonomous driving, expanding their powerful capability of understanding, reasoning, and generating natural languages. However, the wide deployment of LLM-based applications exposes critical security and reliability risks, such as the potential for malicious misuse, privacy leakage, and service disruption that weaken user trust and undermine societal safety. This paper provides a systematic overview of the details of adversarial attacks targeting both LLMs and LLM-based agents. These attacks are organized into three phases in LLMs: Training-Phase Attacks, Inference-Phase Attacks, and Availability & Integrity Attacks. For each phase, we analyze the details of representative and recently introduced attack methods along with their corresponding defenses. We hope our survey will provide a good tutorial and a comprehensive understanding of LLM security, especially for attacks on LLMs. We desire to raise attention to the risks inherent in widely deployed LLM-based applications and highlight the urgent need for robust mitigation strategies for evolving threats.

LLM applications (i.e., LLM apps) leverage the powerful capabilities of LLMs to provide users with customized services, revolutionizing traditional application development. While the increasing prevalence of LLM-powered applications provides users with unprecedented convenience, it also brings forth new security challenges. For such an emerging ecosystem, the security community lacks sufficient understanding of the LLM application ecosystem, especially regarding the capability boundaries of the applications themselves. In this paper, we systematically analyzed the new development paradigm and defined the concept of the LLM app capability space. We also uncovered potential new risks beyond jailbreak that arise from ambiguous capability boundaries in real-world scenarios, namely, capability downgrade and upgrade. To evaluate the impact of these risks, we designed and implemented an LLM app capability evaluation framework, LLMApp-Eval. First, we collected application metadata across 4 platforms and conducted a cross-platform ecosystem analysis. Then, we evaluated the risks for 199 popular applications among 4 platforms and 6 open-source LLMs. We identified that 178 (89.45%) potentially affected applications, which can perform tasks from more than 15 scenarios or be malicious. We even found 17 applications in our study that executed malicious tasks directly, without applying any adversarial rewriting. Furthermore, our experiments also reveal a positive correlation between the quality of prompt design and application robustness. We found that well-designed prompts enhance security, while poorly designed ones can facilitate abuse. We hope our work inspires the community to focus on the real-world risks of LLM applications and foster the development of a more robust LLM application ecosystem.

Large language models (LLMs) are being rapidly integrated into decision-support tools, automation workflows, and AI-enabled software systems. However, their behavior in production environments remains poorly understood, and their failure patterns differ fundamentally from those of traditional machine learning models. This paper presents a system-level taxonomy of fifteen hidden failure modes that arise in real-world LLM applications, including multi-step reasoning drift, latent inconsistency, context-boundary degradation, incorrect tool invocation, version drift, and cost-driven performance collapse. Using this taxonomy, we analyze the growing gap in evaluation and monitoring practices: existing benchmarks measure knowledge or reasoning but provide little insight into stability, reproducibility, drift, or workflow integration. We further examine the production challenges associated with deploying LLMs - including observability limitations, cost constraints, and update-induced regressions - and outline high-level design principles for building reliable, maintainable, and cost-aware LLM systems. Finally, we outline high-level design principles for building reliable, maintainable, and cost-aware LLM-based systems. By framing LLM reliability as a system-engineering problem rather than a purely model-centric one, this work provides an analytical foundation for future research on evaluation methodology, AI system robustness, and dependable LLM deployment.

Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tools are essential for identifying software vulnerabilities, but they often produce a high volume of false positives (FPs), imposing a substantial manual triage burden on developers. Recent advances in Large Language Model (LLM) agents offer a promising direction by enabling iterative reasoning, tool use, and environment interaction to refine SAST alerts. However, the comparative effectiveness of different LLM-based agent architectures for FP filtering remains poorly understood. In this paper, we present a comparative study of three state-of-the-art LLM-based agent frameworks, i.e., Aider, OpenHands, and SWE-agent, for vulnerability FP filtering. We evaluate these frameworks using the vulnerabilities from the OWASP Benchmark and real-world open-source Java projects. The experimental results show that LLM-based agents can remove the majority of SAST noise, reducing an initial FP detection rate of over 92% on the OWASP Benchmark to as low as 6.3% in the best configuration. On real-world dataset, the best configuration of LLM-based agents can achieve an FP identification rate of up to 93.3% involving CodeQL alerts. However, the benefits of agents are strongly backbone- and CWE-dependent: agentic frameworks significantly outperform vanilla prompting for stronger models such as Claude Sonnet 4 and GPT-5, but yield limited or inconsistent gains for weaker backbones. Moreover, aggressive FP reduction can come at the cost of suppressing true vulnerabilities, highlighting important trade-offs. Finally, we observe large disparities in computational cost across agent frameworks. Overall, our study demonstrates that LLM-based agents are a powerful but non-uniform solution for SAST FP filtering, and that their practical deployment requires careful consideration of agent design, backbone model choice, vulnerability category, and operational cost.

LLM-integrated software, which embeds or interacts with large language models (LLMs) as functional components, exhibits probabilistic and context-dependent behaviors that fundamentally differ from those of traditional software. This shift introduces a new category of integration defects that arise not only from code errors but also from misaligned interactions among LLM-specific artifacts, including prompts, API calls, configurations, and model outputs. However, existing defect localization techniques are ineffective at identifying these LLM-specific integration defects because they fail to capture cross-layer dependencies across heterogeneous artifacts, cannot exploit incomplete or misleading error traces, and lack semantic reasoning capabilities for identifying root causes. To address these challenges, we propose LIDL, a multi-agent framework for defect localization in LLM-integrated software. LIDL (1) constructs a code knowledge graph enriched with LLM-aware annotations that represent interaction boundaries across source code, prompts, and configuration files, (2) fuses three complementary sources of error evidence inferred by LLMs to surface candidate defect locations, and (3) applies context-aware validation that uses counterfactual reasoning to distinguish true root causes from propagated symptoms. We evaluate LIDL on 146 real-world defect instances collected from 105 GitHub repositories and 16 agent-based systems. The results show that LIDL significantly outperforms five state-of-the-art baselines across all metrics, achieving a Top-3 accuracy of 0.64 and a MAP of 0.48, which represents a 64.1% improvement over the best-performing baseline. Notably, LIDL achieves these gains while reducing cost by 92.5%, demonstrating both high accuracy and cost efficiency.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are one of the most promising developments in the field of artificial intelligence, and the software engineering community has readily noticed their potential role in the software development life-cycle. Developers routinely ask LLMs to generate code snippets, increasing productivity but also potentially introducing ownership, privacy, correctness, and security issues. Previous work highlighted how code generated by mainstream commercial LLMs is often not safe, containing vulnerabilities, bugs, and code smells. In this paper, we present a framework that leverages testing and static analysis to assess the quality, and guide the self-improvement, of code generated by general-purpose, open-source LLMs. First, we ask LLMs to generate C code to solve a number of programming tasks. Then we employ ground-truth tests to assess the (in)correctness of the generated code, and a static analysis tool to detect potential safety vulnerabilities. Next, we assess the models ability to evaluate the generated code, by asking them to detect errors and vulnerabilities. Finally, we test the models ability to fix the generated code, providing the reports produced during the static analysis and incorrectness evaluation phases as feedback. Our results show that models often produce incorrect code, and that the generated code can include safety issues. Moreover, they perform very poorly at detecting either issue. On the positive side, we observe a substantial ability to fix flawed code when provided with information about failed tests or potential vulnerabilities, indicating a promising avenue for improving the safety of LLM-based code generation tools.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown tremendous promise in automated software engineering. In this paper, we investigate the opportunities of LLMs for automatic regression test generation for programs that take highly structured, human-readable inputs, such as XML parsers or JavaScript interpreters. Concretely, we explore the following regression test generation scenarios for such programs that have so far been difficult to test automatically in the absence of corresponding input grammars: bullet Bug finding. Given a code change (e.g., a commit or pull request), our LLM-based approach generates a test case with the objective of revealing any bugs that might be introduced if that change is applied. bullet Patch testing. Given a patch, our LLM-based approach generates a test case that fails before but passes after the patch. This test can be added to the regression test suite to catch similar bugs in the future. We implement Cleverest, a feedback-directed, zero-shot LLM-based regression test generation technique, and evaluate its effectiveness on 22 commits to three subject programs: Mujs, Libxml2, and Poppler. For programs using more human-readable file formats, like XML or JavaScript, we found Cleverest performed very well. It generated easy-to-understand bug-revealing or bug-reproduction test cases for the majority of commits in just under three minutes -- even when only the code diff or commit message (unless it was too vague) was given. For programs with more compact file formats, like PDF, as expected, it struggled to generate effective test cases. However, the LLM-supplied test cases are not very far from becoming effective (e.g., when used as a seed by a greybox fuzzer or as a starting point by the developer).

Software issue resolution aims to address real-world issues in software repositories (e.g., bug fixing and efficiency optimization) based on natural language descriptions provided by users, representing a key aspect of software maintenance. With the rapid development of large language models (LLMs) in reasoning and generative capabilities, LLM-based approaches have made significant progress in automated software issue resolution. However, real-world software issue resolution is inherently complex and requires long-horizon reasoning, iterative exploration, and feedback-driven decision making, which demand agentic capabilities beyond conventional single-step approaches. Recently, LLM-based agentic systems have become mainstream for software issue resolution. Advancements in agentic software issue resolution not only greatly enhance software maintenance efficiency and quality but also provide a realistic environment for validating agentic systems' reasoning, planning, and execution capabilities, bridging artificial intelligence and software engineering. This work presents a systematic survey of 126 recent studies at the forefront of LLM-based agentic software issue resolution research. It outlines the general workflow of the task and establishes a taxonomy across three dimensions: benchmarks, techniques, and empirical studies. Furthermore, it highlights how the emergence of agentic reinforcement learning has brought a paradigm shift in the design and training of agentic systems for software engineering. Finally, it summarizes key challenges and outlines promising directions for future research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show promise in generating firmware for embedded systems, but often introduce security flaws and fail to meet real-time performance constraints. This paper proposes a three-phase methodology that combines LLM-based firmware generation with automated security validation and iterative refinement in a virtualized environment. Using structured prompts, models like GPT-4 generate firmware for networking and control tasks, deployed on FreeRTOS via QEMU. These implementations are tested using fuzzing, static analysis, and runtime monitoring to detect vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows (CWE-120), race conditions (CWE-362), and denial-of-service threats (CWE-400). Specialized AI agents for Threat Detection, Performance Optimization, and Compliance Verification collaborate to improve detection and remediation. Identified issues are categorized using CWE, then used to prompt targeted LLM-generated patches in an iterative loop. Experiments show a 92.4\% Vulnerability Remediation Rate (37.3\% improvement), 95.8\% Threat Model Compliance, and 0.87 Security Coverage Index. Real-time metrics include 8.6ms worst-case execution time and 195μs jitter. This process enhances firmware security and performance while contributing an open-source dataset for future research.

Large language models (LLMs) introduce new security risks, but there are few comprehensive evaluation suites to measure and reduce these risks. We present BenchmarkName, a novel benchmark to quantify LLM security risks and capabilities. We introduce two new areas for testing: prompt injection and code interpreter abuse. We evaluated multiple state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, including GPT-4, Mistral, Meta Llama 3 70B-Instruct, and Code Llama. Our results show that conditioning away risk of attack remains an unsolved problem; for example, all tested models showed between 26% and 41% successful prompt injection tests. We further introduce the safety-utility tradeoff: conditioning an LLM to reject unsafe prompts can cause the LLM to falsely reject answering benign prompts, which lowers utility. We propose quantifying this tradeoff using False Refusal Rate (FRR). As an illustration, we introduce a novel test set to quantify FRR for cyberattack helpfulness risk. We find many LLMs able to successfully comply with "borderline" benign requests while still rejecting most unsafe requests. Finally, we quantify the utility of LLMs for automating a core cybersecurity task, that of exploiting software vulnerabilities. This is important because the offensive capabilities of LLMs are of intense interest; we quantify this by creating novel test sets for four representative problems. We find that models with coding capabilities perform better than those without, but that further work is needed for LLMs to become proficient at exploit generation. Our code is open source and can be used to evaluate other LLMs.

The rapid advancement of bug-finding techniques has led to the discovery of more vulnerabilities than developers can reasonably fix, creating an urgent need for effective Automated Program Repair (APR) methods. However, the complexity of modern bugs often makes precise root cause analysis difficult and unreliable. To address this challenge, we propose crash-site repair to simplify the repair task while still mitigating the risk of exploitation. In addition, we introduce a template-guided patch generation approach that significantly reduces the token cost of Large Language Models (LLMs) while maintaining both efficiency and effectiveness. We implement our prototype system, WILLIAMT, and evaluate it against state-of-the-art APR tools. Our results show that, when combined with the top-performing agent CodeRover-S, WILLIAMT reduces token cost by 45.9% and increases the bug-fixing rate to 73.5% (+29.6%) on ARVO, a ground-truth open source software vulnerabilities benchmark. Furthermore, we demonstrate that WILLIAMT can function effectively even without access to frontier LLMs: even a local model running on a Mac M4 Mini achieves a reasonable repair rate. These findings highlight the broad applicability and scalability of WILLIAMT.

Smart contracts are decentralized applications built atop blockchains like Ethereum. Recent research has shown that large language models (LLMs) have potential in auditing smart contracts, but the state-of-the-art indicates that even GPT-4 can achieve only 30% precision (when both decision and justification are correct). This is likely because off-the-shelf LLMs were primarily pre-trained on a general text/code corpus and not fine-tuned on the specific domain of Solidity smart contract auditing. In this paper, we propose TrustLLM, a general framework that combines fine-tuning and LLM-based agents for intuitive smart contract auditing with justifications. Specifically, TrustLLM is inspired by the observation that expert human auditors first perceive what could be wrong and then perform a detailed analysis of the code to identify the cause. As such, TrustLLM employs a two-stage fine-tuning approach: it first tunes a Detector model to make decisions and then tunes a Reasoner model to generate causes of vulnerabilities. However, fine-tuning alone faces challenges in accurately identifying the optimal cause of a vulnerability. Therefore, we introduce two LLM-based agents, the Ranker and Critic, to iteratively select and debate the most suitable cause of vulnerability based on the output of the fine-tuned Reasoner model. To evaluate TrustLLM, we collected a balanced dataset with 1,734 positive and 1,810 negative samples to fine-tune TrustLLM. We then compared it with traditional fine-tuned models (CodeBERT, GraphCodeBERT, CodeT5, and UnixCoder) as well as prompt learning-based LLMs (GPT4, GPT-3.5, and CodeLlama-13b/34b). On a dataset of 263 real smart contract vulnerabilities, TrustLLM achieves an F1 score of 91.21% and an accuracy of 91.11%. The causes generated by TrustLLM achieved a consistency of about 38% compared to the ground truth causes.

LLMs show promise in transforming software development, with a growing interest in integrating them into more intelligent apps. Frameworks like LangChain aid LLM-integrated app development, offering code execution utility/APIs for custom actions. However, these capabilities theoretically introduce Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, enabling remote code execution through prompt injections. No prior research systematically investigates these frameworks' RCE vulnerabilities or their impact on applications and exploitation consequences. Therefore, there is a huge research gap in this field. In this study, we propose LLMSmith to detect, validate and exploit the RCE vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated frameworks and apps. To achieve this goal, we develop two novel techniques, including 1) a lightweight static analysis to examine LLM integration mechanisms, and construct call chains to identify RCE vulnerabilities in frameworks; 2) a systematical prompt-based exploitation method to verify and exploit the found vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated apps. This technique involves various strategies to control LLM outputs, trigger RCE vulnerabilities and launch subsequent attacks. Our research has uncovered a total of 20 vulnerabilities in 11 LLM-integrated frameworks, comprising 19 RCE vulnerabilities and 1 arbitrary file read/write vulnerability. Of these, 17 have been confirmed by the framework developers, with 11 vulnerabilities being assigned CVE IDs. For the 51 apps potentially affected by RCE, we successfully executed attacks on 17 apps, 16 of which are vulnerable to RCE and 1 to SQL injection. Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of these vulnerabilities and construct practical attacks to demonstrate the hazards in reality. Last, we propose several mitigation measures for both framework and app developers to counteract such attacks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have seen rapid adoption in recent years, with industries increasingly relying on them to maintain a competitive advantage. These models excel at interpreting user instructions and generating human-like responses, leading to their integration across diverse domains, including consulting and information retrieval. However, their widespread deployment also introduces substantial security risks, most notably in the form of prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. To systematically evaluate LLM vulnerabilities -- particularly to external prompt injection -- we conducted a series of experiments on eight commercial models. Each model was tested without supplementary sanitization, relying solely on its built-in safeguards. The results exposed exploitable weaknesses and emphasized the need for stronger security measures. Four categories of attacks were examined: direct injection, indirect (external) injection, image-based injection, and prompt leakage. Comparative analysis indicated that Claude 3 demonstrated relatively greater robustness; nevertheless, empirical findings confirm that additional defenses, such as input normalization, remain necessary to achieve reliable protection.

With the rapid development of large language models (LLMs), distributed training and inference frameworks like DeepSpeed have become essential for scaling model training and inference across multiple GPUs or nodes. However, the increasing complexity of these frameworks brings non-trivial software bugs, which may degrade training performance, cause unexpected failures, and result in significant resource waste. Understanding framework bugs' characteristics is fundamental for quality assurance, allowing the design of more effective debugging and repair methods. Thus, our paper conducts the first large-scale empirical analysis of 308 fixed bugs across three popular distributed training/inference frameworks: DeepSpeed, Megatron-LM, and Colossal-AI. We examine bug symptoms, root causes, bug identification and fixing efforts, and common low-effort fixing strategies. Additionally, the distributed nature of these frameworks introduces unique bug root causes, such as allocation strategy error and distributed communication error. Diagnosing and fixing complex bugs remains challenging due to factors like the disconnect between symptoms and root causes, high bug reproduction costs, and low-level or cross-component interactions. Interestingly, we observe that 48% of bug fixes require minimal code changes (<=10 LOC) and follow simple strategies such as conditional logic optimization, parameter handling enhancement, or version compatibility handling, indicating potential for automation. Based on these insights, we offer several implications for improving the reliability of both distributed training and inference frameworks and their dependent LLM projects, while also identifying opportunities to leverage LLM-based tools for automated debugging and repair.

Large Language Model (LLM) libraries have emerged as the foundational infrastructure powering today's AI revolution, serving as the backbone for LLM deployment, inference optimization, fine-tuning, and production serving across diverse applications. Despite their critical role in the LLM ecosystem, these libraries face frequent quality issues and bugs that threaten the reliability of AI systems built upon them. To address this knowledge gap, we present the first comprehensive empirical investigation into bug characteristics and testing practices in modern LLM libraries. We examine 313 bug-fixing commits extracted across two widely-adopted LLM libraries: HuggingFace Transformers and vLLM.Through rigorous manual analysis, we establish comprehensive taxonomies categorizing bug symptoms into 5 types and root causes into 14 distinct categories.Our primary discovery shows that API misuse has emerged as the predominant root cause (32.17%-48.19%), representing a notable transition from algorithm-focused defects in conventional deep learning frameworks toward interface-oriented problems. Additionally, we examine 7,748 test functions to identify 7 distinct test oracle categories employed in current testing approaches, with predefined expected outputs (such as specific tensors and text strings) being the most common strategy. Our assessment of existing testing effectiveness demonstrates that the majority of bugs escape detection due to inadequate test cases (41.73%), lack of test drivers (32.37%), and weak test oracles (25.90%). Drawing from these findings, we offer some recommendations for enhancing LLM library quality assurance.

Smart contracts are essential to decentralized finance (DeFi) and blockchain ecosystems but are increasingly vulnerable to exploits due to coding errors and complex attack vectors. Traditional static analysis tools and existing vulnerability detection methods often fail to address these challenges comprehensively, leading to high false-positive rates and an inability to detect dynamic vulnerabilities. This paper introduces SmartLLM, a novel approach leveraging fine-tuned LLaMA 3.1 models with Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to enhance the accuracy and efficiency of smart contract auditing. By integrating domain-specific knowledge from ERC standards and employing advanced techniques such as QLoRA for efficient fine-tuning, SmartLLM achieves superior performance compared to static analysis tools like Mythril and Slither, as well as zero-shot large language model (LLM) prompting methods such as GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. Experimental results demonstrate a perfect recall of 100% and an accuracy score of 70%, highlighting the model's robustness in identifying vulnerabilities, including reentrancy and access control issues. This research advances smart contract security by offering a scalable and effective auditing solution, supporting the secure adoption of decentralized applications.

LLMs have becoming increasingly powerful, both in their benign and malicious uses. With the increase in capabilities, researchers have been increasingly interested in their ability to exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities. In particular, recent work has conducted preliminary studies on the ability of LLM agents to autonomously hack websites. However, these studies are limited to simple vulnerabilities. In this work, we show that LLM agents can autonomously exploit one-day vulnerabilities in real-world systems. To show this, we collected a dataset of 15 one-day vulnerabilities that include ones categorized as critical severity in the CVE description. When given the CVE description, GPT-4 is capable of exploiting 87% of these vulnerabilities compared to 0% for every other model we test (GPT-3.5, open-source LLMs) and open-source vulnerability scanners (ZAP and Metasploit). Fortunately, our GPT-4 agent requires the CVE description for high performance: without the description, GPT-4 can exploit only 7% of the vulnerabilities. Our findings raise questions around the widespread deployment of highly capable LLM agents.

Automating software vulnerability detection (SVD) remains a critical challenge in an era of increasingly complex and interdependent software systems. Despite significant advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) for code analysis, prevailing evaluation methodologies often lack the context-aware robustness necessary to capture real-world intricacies and cross-component interactions. To address these limitations, we present VulnSage, a comprehensive evaluation framework and a dataset curated from diverse, large-scale open-source system software projects developed in C/C++. Unlike prior datasets, it leverages a heuristic noise pre-filtering approach combined with LLM-based reasoning to ensure a representative and minimally noisy spectrum of vulnerabilities. The framework supports multi-granular analysis across function, file, and inter-function levels and employs four diverse zero-shot prompt strategies: Baseline, Chain-of-Thought, Think, and Think & Verify. Through this evaluation, we uncover that structured reasoning prompts substantially improve LLM performance, with Think & Verify reducing ambiguous responses from 20.3% to 9.1% while increasing accuracy. We further demonstrate that code-specialized models consistently outperform general-purpose alternatives, with performance varying significantly across vulnerability types, revealing that no single approach universally excels across all security contexts. Link to dataset and codes: https://github.com/Erroristotle/VulnSage.git

Large Language Models (LLMs) have exhibited significant proficiency in code debugging, especially in automatic program repair, which may substantially reduce the time consumption of developers and enhance their efficiency. Significant advancements in debugging datasets have been made to promote the development of code debugging. However, these datasets primarily focus on assessing the LLM's function-level code repair capabilities, neglecting the more complex and realistic repository-level scenarios, which leads to an incomplete understanding of the LLM's challenges in repository-level debugging. While several repository-level datasets have been proposed, they often suffer from limitations such as limited diversity of tasks, languages, and error types. To mitigate this challenge, this paper introduces RepoDebug, a multi-task and multi-language repository-level code debugging dataset with 22 subtypes of errors that supports 8 commonly used programming languages and 3 debugging tasks. Furthermore, we conduct evaluation experiments on 10 LLMs, where Claude 3.5 Sonnect, the best-performing model, still cannot perform well in repository-level debugging.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are highly vulnerable to input perturbations, as even a small prompt change may result in a substantially different output. Existing methods to enhance LLM robustness are primarily focused on perturbed data samples, whereas improving resiliency to perturbations of task-level instructions has remained relatively underexplored. In this work, we focus on character- and word-level edits of task-specific instructions, which substantially degrade downstream performance. We experiment with a variety of techniques to enhance the robustness of LLMs, including self-denoising and representation alignment, testing different models (Llama 3 and Flan-T5), datasets (CoLA, QNLI, SST-2) and instructions (both task-oriented and role-oriented). We find that, on average, self-denoising -- whether performed by a frozen LLM or a fine-tuned model -- achieves substantially higher performance gains than alternative strategies, including more complex baselines such as ensembling and supervised methods.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promising performance in software vulnerability detection, yet their reasoning capabilities remain unreliable. We propose R2Vul, a method that combines reinforcement learning from AI feedback (RLAIF) and structured reasoning distillation to teach small code LLMs to detect vulnerabilities while generating security-aware explanations. Unlike prior chain-of-thought and instruction tuning approaches, R2Vul rewards well-founded over deceptively plausible vulnerability explanations through RLAIF, which results in more precise detection and high-quality reasoning generation. To support RLAIF, we construct the first multilingual preference dataset for vulnerability detection, comprising 18,000 high-quality samples in C\#, JavaScript, Java, Python, and C. We evaluate R2Vul across five programming languages and against four static analysis tools, eight state-of-the-art LLM-based baselines, and various fine-tuning approaches. Our results demonstrate that a 1.5B R2Vul model exceeds the performance of its 32B teacher model and leading commercial LLMs such as Claude-4-Opus. Furthermore, we introduce a lightweight calibration step that reduces false positive rates under varying imbalanced data distributions. Finally, through qualitative analysis, we show that both LLM and human evaluators consistently rank R2Vul model's reasoning higher than other reasoning-based baselines.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise in software engineering tasks, but evaluating their effectiveness in vulnerability detection is challenging due to the lack of high-quality datasets. Most existing datasets are limited to function-level labels, ignoring finer-grained vulnerability patterns and crucial contextual information. Also, poor data quality such as mislabeling, inconsistent annotations, and duplicates can lead to inflated performance and weak generalization. Moreover, by including only the functions, these datasets miss broader program context, like data/control dependencies and interprocedural interactions, that are essential for accurately understanding real-world security flaws. Without this context, detection models are evaluated under unrealistic assumptions. To address these limitations, this paper introduces SecVulEval, a benchmark designed to support fine-grained evaluation of LLMs and other detection methods with rich contextual information. SecVulEval focuses on real-world C/C++ vulnerabilities at the statement level. This granularity enables more precise evaluation of a model's ability to localize vulnerabilities, beyond simple binary classification at the function level. By incorporating rich contextual information, SecVulEval sets a new standard for vulnerability detection benchmarks in realistic scenarios. This benchmark includes 25,440 function samples covering 5,867 unique CVEs in C/C++ projects from 1999 to 2024. We evaluated the SOTA LLMs with a multi-agent-based approach. The evaluation on our dataset shows that the models are still far from accurately predicting vulnerable statements in a given function. The best-performing Claude-3.7-Sonnet model achieves 23.83% F1-score for detecting vulnerable statements with correct reasoning. Finally, we analyze the LLM outputs and provide insights into their behavior in vulnerability detection for C/C++.

Auto-completing code enables developers to speed up coding significantly. Recent advances in transformer-based large language model (LLM) technologies have been applied to code synthesis. However, studies show that many of such synthesized codes contain vulnerabilities. We propose a novel vulnerability-constrained decoding approach to reduce the amount of vulnerable code generated by such models. Using a small dataset of labeled vulnerable lines of code, we fine-tune an LLM to include vulnerability labels when generating code, acting as an embedded classifier. Then, during decoding, we deny the model to generate these labels to avoid generating vulnerable code. To evaluate the method, we chose to automatically complete Ethereum Blockchain smart contracts (SCs) as the case study due to the strict requirements of SC security. We first fine-tuned the 6-billion-parameter GPT-J model using 186,397 Ethereum SCs after removing the duplication from 2,217,692 SCs. The fine-tuning took more than one week using ten GPUs. The results showed that our fine-tuned model could synthesize SCs with an average BLEU (BiLingual Evaluation Understudy) score of 0.557. However, many codes in the auto-completed SCs were vulnerable. Using the code before the vulnerable line of 176 SCs containing different types of vulnerabilities to auto-complete the code, we found that more than 70% of the auto-completed codes were insecure. Thus, we further fine-tuned the model on other 941 vulnerable SCs containing the same types of vulnerabilities and applied vulnerability-constrained decoding. The fine-tuning took only one hour with four GPUs. We then auto-completed the 176 SCs again and found that our approach could identify 62% of the code to be generated as vulnerable and avoid generating 67% of them, indicating the approach could efficiently and effectively avoid vulnerabilities in the auto-completed code.

LLMs are increasingly used for code generation, but their outputs often follow recurring templates that can induce predictable vulnerabilities. We study vulnerability persistence in LLM-generated software and introduce Feature--Security Table (FSTab) with two components. First, FSTab enables a black-box attack that predicts likely backend vulnerabilities from observable frontend features and knowledge of the source LLM, without access to backend code or source code. Second, FSTab provides a model-centric evaluation that quantifies how consistently a given model reproduces the same vulnerabilities across programs, semantics-preserving rephrasings, and application domains. We evaluate FSTab on state-of-the-art code LLMs, including GPT-5.2, Claude-4.5 Opus, and Gemini-3 Pro, across diverse application domains. Our results show strong cross-domain transfer: even when the target domain is excluded from training, FSTab achieves up to 94\% attack success and 93\% vulnerability coverage on Internal Tools (Claude-4.5 Opus). These findings expose an underexplored attack surface in LLM-generated software and highlight the security risks of code generation. Our code is available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/FSTab-024E.

As modern microservice systems grow increasingly popular and complex-often consisting of hundreds or even thousands of fine-grained, interdependent components-they are becoming more susceptible to frequent and subtle failures. Ensuring system reliability therefore hinges on accurate and efficient failure localization. Traditional failure localization approaches based on small models lack the flexibility to adapt to diverse failure scenarios, while recent LLM-based methods suffer from two major limitations: they often rely on rigid invocation workflows that constrain the model's ability to dynamically explore optimal localization paths, and they require resource-intensive inference, making them cost-prohibitive for real-world deployment. To address these challenges, we explore the use of reinforcement fine-tuning to equip lightweight LLMs with reasoning and self-refinement capabilities, significantly improving the cost-effectiveness and adaptability of LLM-based failure localization. We begin with an empirical study to identify three key capabilities essential for accurate localization. Building on these insights, we propose a progressive multi-stage GRPO fine-tuning framework, which integrates a multi-factor failure localization grader and a recursion-of-thought actor module. The resulting model, ThinkFL, not only outperforms existing state-of-the-art LLMs and baseline methods in localization accuracy but also reduces end-to-end localization latency from minutes to seconds, demonstrating strong potential for real-world applications.

The advent of instruction-tuned Large Language Models designed for coding tasks (Code LLMs) has transformed software engineering practices. However, their robustness against various input challenges remains a critical concern. This study introduces DegradePrompter, a novel method designed to systematically evaluate the robustness of instruction-tuned Code LLMs. We assess the impact of diverse input challenges on the functionality and correctness of generated code using rigorous metrics and established benchmarks. Our comprehensive evaluation includes five state-of-the-art open-source models and three production-grade closed-source models, revealing varying degrees of robustness. Open-source models demonstrate an increased susceptibility to input perturbations, resulting in declines in functional correctness ranging from 12% to 34%. In contrast, commercial models demonstrate relatively greater resilience, with performance degradation ranging from 3% to 24%. To enhance the robustness of the models against these vulnerabilities, we investigate a straightforward yet effective mitigation strategy. Our findings highlight the need for robust defense mechanisms and comprehensive evaluations during both the development and deployment phases to ensure the resilience and reliability of automated code generation systems.

In the current cybersecurity landscape, protecting military devices such as communication and battlefield management systems against sophisticated cyber attacks is crucial. Malware exploits vulnerabilities through stealth methods, often evading traditional detection mechanisms such as software signatures. The application of ML/DL in vulnerability detection has been extensively explored in the literature. However, current ML/DL vulnerability detection methods struggle with understanding the context and intent behind complex attacks. Integrating large language models (LLMs) with system call analysis offers a promising approach to enhance malware detection. This work presents a novel framework leveraging LLMs to classify malware based on system call data. The framework uses transfer learning to adapt pre-trained LLMs for malware detection. By retraining LLMs on a dataset of benign and malicious system calls, the models are refined to detect signs of malware activity. Experiments with a dataset of over 1TB of system calls demonstrate that models with larger context sizes, such as BigBird and Longformer, achieve superior accuracy and F1-Score of approximately 0.86. The results highlight the importance of context size in improving detection rates and underscore the trade-offs between computational complexity and performance. This approach shows significant potential for real-time detection in high-stakes environments, offering a robust solution to evolving cyber threats.

In real world software development, improper or missing exception handling can severely impact the robustness and reliability of code. Exception handling mechanisms require developers to detect, capture, and manage exceptions according to high standards, but many developers struggle with these tasks, leading to fragile code. This problem is particularly evident in open-source projects and impacts the overall quality of the software ecosystem. To address this challenge, we explore the use of large language models (LLMs) to improve exception handling in code. Through extensive analysis, we identify three key issues: Insensitive Detection of Fragile Code, Inaccurate Capture of Exception Block, and Distorted Handling Solution. These problems are widespread across real world repositories, suggesting that robust exception handling practices are often overlooked or mishandled. In response, we propose Seeker, a multi-agent framework inspired by expert developer strategies for exception handling. Seeker uses agents: Scanner, Detector, Predator, Ranker, and Handler to assist LLMs in detecting, capturing, and resolving exceptions more effectively. Our work is the first systematic study on leveraging LLMs to enhance exception handling practices in real development scenarios, providing valuable insights for future improvements in code reliability.

Research shows that grammatical mistakes in a sentence can be corrected by translating it to another language and back using neural machine translation with language models. We investigate whether this correction capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) extends to Automatic Program Repair (APR). Current generative models for APR are pre-trained on source code and fine-tuned for repair. This paper proposes bypassing the fine-tuning step and using Round-Trip Translation (RTT): translation of code from one programming language to another programming or natural language, and back. We hypothesize that RTT with LLMs restores the most commonly seen patterns in code during pre-training, i.e., performs a regression toward the mean, which removes bugs as they are a form of noise w.r.t. the more frequent, natural, bug-free code in the training data. To test this hypothesis, we employ eight recent LLMs pre-trained on code, including the latest GPT versions, and four common program repair benchmarks in Java. We find that RTT with English as an intermediate language repaired 101 of 164 bugs with GPT-4 on the HumanEval-Java dataset. Moreover, 46 of these are unique bugs that are not repaired by other LLMs fine-tuned for APR. Our findings highlight the viability of round-trip translation with LLMs as a technique for automated program repair and its potential for research in software engineering. Keywords: automated program repair, large language model, machine translation

Tool-calling has changed Large Language Model (LLM) applications by integrating external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality across diverse tasks. However, this integration also introduces new security vulnerabilities, particularly in the tool scheduling mechanisms of LLM, which have not been extensively studied. To fill this gap, we present ToolCommander, a novel framework designed to exploit vulnerabilities in LLM tool-calling systems through adversarial tool injection. Our framework employs a well-designed two-stage attack strategy. Firstly, it injects malicious tools to collect user queries, then dynamically updates the injected tools based on the stolen information to enhance subsequent attacks. These stages enable ToolCommander to execute privacy theft, launch denial-of-service attacks, and even manipulate business competition by triggering unscheduled tool-calling. Notably, the ASR reaches 91.67% for privacy theft and hits 100% for denial-of-service and unscheduled tool calling in certain cases. Our work demonstrates that these vulnerabilities can lead to severe consequences beyond simple misuse of tool-calling systems, underscoring the urgent need for robust defensive strategies to secure LLM Tool-calling systems.

Large language model (LLM)-based AI agents extend LLM capabilities by enabling access to tools such as data sources, APIs, search engines, code sandboxes, and even other agents. While this empowers agents to perform complex tasks, LLMs may invoke unintended tool interactions and introduce risks, such as leaking sensitive data or overwriting critical records, which are unacceptable in enterprise contexts. Current approaches to mitigate these risks, such as model-based safeguards, enhance agents' reliability but cannot guarantee system safety. Methods like information flow control (IFC) and temporal constraints aim to provide guarantees but often require extensive human annotation. We propose a process that starts with applying System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) to identify hazards in agent workflows, derive safety requirements, and formalize them as enforceable specifications on data flows and tool sequences. To enable this, we introduce a capability-enhanced Model Context Protocol (MCP) framework that requires structured labels on capabilities, confidentiality, and trust level. Together, these contributions aim to shift LLM-based agent safety from ad hoc reliability fixes to proactive guardrails with formal guarantees, while reducing dependence on user confirmation and making autonomy a deliberate design choice.

As the use of large language model (LLM) agents continues to grow, their safety vulnerabilities have become increasingly evident. Extensive benchmarks evaluate various aspects of LLM safety by defining the safety relying heavily on general standards, overlooking user-specific standards. However, safety standards for LLM may vary based on a user-specific profiles rather than being universally consistent across all users. This raises a critical research question: Do LLM agents act safely when considering user-specific safety standards? Despite its importance for safe LLM use, no benchmark datasets currently exist to evaluate the user-specific safety of LLMs. To address this gap, we introduce U-SAFEBENCH, the first benchmark designed to assess user-specific aspect of LLM safety. Our evaluation of 18 widely used LLMs reveals current LLMs fail to act safely when considering user-specific safety standards, marking a new discovery in this field. To address this vulnerability, we propose a simple remedy based on chain-of-thought, demonstrating its effectiveness in improving user-specific safety. Our benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/yeonjun-in/U-SafeBench.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed and integrated into thousands of applications, the need for scalable evaluation of how models respond to adversarial attacks grows rapidly. However, LLM security is a moving target: models produce unpredictable output, are constantly updated, and the potential adversary is highly diverse: anyone with access to the internet and a decent command of natural language. Further, what constitutes a security weak in one context may not be an issue in a different context; one-fits-all guardrails remain theoretical. In this paper, we argue that it is time to rethink what constitutes ``LLM security'', and pursue a holistic approach to LLM security evaluation, where exploration and discovery of issues are central. To this end, this paper introduces garak (Generative AI Red-teaming and Assessment Kit), a framework which can be used to discover and identify vulnerabilities in a target LLM or dialog system. garak probes an LLM in a structured fashion to discover potential vulnerabilities. The outputs of the framework describe a target model's weaknesses, contribute to an informed discussion of what composes vulnerabilities in unique contexts, and can inform alignment and policy discussions for LLM deployment.

This study presents a quantitative evaluation of the code quality and security of five prominent Large Language Models (LLMs): Claude Sonnet 4, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, GPT-4o, Llama 3.2 90B, and OpenCoder 8B. While prior research has assessed the functional performance of LLM-generated code, this research tested LLM output from 4,442 Java coding assignments through comprehensive static analysis using SonarQube. The findings suggest that although LLMs can generate functional code, they also introduce a range of software defects, including bugs, security vulnerabilities, and code smells. These defects do not appear to be isolated; rather, they may represent shared weaknesses stemming from systemic limitations within current LLM code generation methods. In particular, critically severe issues, such as hard-coded passwords and path traversal vulnerabilities, were observed across multiple models. These results indicate that LLM-generated code requires verification in order to be considered production-ready. This study found no direct correlation between a model's functional performance (measured by Pass@1 rate of unit tests) and the overall quality and security of its generated code, measured by the number of SonarQube issues in benchmark solutions that passed the functional tests. This suggests that functional benchmark performance score is not a good indicator of overall code quality and security. The goal of this study is not to rank LLM performance but to highlight that all evaluated models appear to share certain weaknesses. Consequently, these findings support the view that static analysis can be a valuable instrument for detecting latent defects and an important safeguard for organizations that deploy AI in software development.

Security experts reverse engineer (decompile) binary code to identify critical security vulnerabilities. The limited access to source code in vital systems - such as firmware, drivers, and proprietary software used in Critical Infrastructures (CI) - makes this analysis even more crucial on the binary level. Even with available source code, a semantic gap persists after compilation between the source and the binary code executed by the processor. This gap may hinder the detection of vulnerabilities in source code. That being said, current research on Large Language Models (LLMs) overlooks the significance of decompiled binaries in this area by focusing solely on source code. In this work, we are the first to empirically uncover the substantial semantic limitations of state-of-the-art LLMs when it comes to analyzing vulnerabilities in decompiled binaries, largely due to the absence of relevant datasets. To bridge the gap, we introduce DeBinVul, a novel decompiled binary code vulnerability dataset. Our dataset is multi-architecture and multi-optimization, focusing on C/C++ due to their wide usage in CI and association with numerous vulnerabilities. Specifically, we curate 150,872 samples of vulnerable and non-vulnerable decompiled binary code for the task of (i) identifying; (ii) classifying; (iii) describing vulnerabilities; and (iv) recovering function names in the domain of decompiled binaries. Subsequently, we fine-tune state-of-the-art LLMs using DeBinVul and report on a performance increase of 19%, 24%, and 21% in the capabilities of CodeLlama, Llama3, and CodeGen2 respectively, in detecting binary code vulnerabilities. Additionally, using DeBinVul, we report a high performance of 80-90% on the vulnerability classification task. Furthermore, we report improved performance in function name recovery and vulnerability description tasks.

In real world software development, improper or missing exception handling can severely impact the robustness and reliability of code. Exception handling mechanisms require developers to detect, capture, and manage exceptions according to high standards, but many developers struggle with these tasks, leading to fragile code. This problem is particularly evident in open source projects and impacts the overall quality of the software ecosystem. To address this challenge, we explore the use of large language models (LLMs) to improve exception handling in code. Through extensive analysis, we identify three key issues: Insensitive Detection of Fragile Code, Inaccurate Capture of Exception Types, and Distorted Handling Solutions. These problems are widespread across real world repositories, suggesting that robust exception handling practices are often overlooked or mishandled. In response, we propose Seeker, a multi agent framework inspired by expert developer strategies for exception handling. Seeker uses agents: Scanner, Detector, Predator, Ranker, and Handler to assist LLMs in detecting, capturing, and resolving exceptions more effectively. Our work is the first systematic study on leveraging LLMs to enhance exception handling practices, providing valuable insights for future improvements in code reliability.

In recent years, more vulnerabilities have been discovered every day, while manual vulnerability repair requires specialized knowledge and is time-consuming. As a result, many detected or even published vulnerabilities remain unpatched, thereby increasing the exposure of software systems to attacks. Recent advancements in agents based on Large Language Models have demonstrated their increasing capabilities in code understanding and generation, which can be promising to achieve automated vulnerability repair. However, the effectiveness of agents based on static information retrieval is still not sufficient for patch generation. To address the challenge, we propose a program repair agent called VulDebugger that fully utilizes both static and dynamic context, and it debugs programs in a manner akin to humans. The agent inspects the actual state of the program via the debugger and infers expected states via constraints that need to be satisfied. By continuously comparing the actual state with the expected state, it deeply understands the root causes of the vulnerabilities and ultimately accomplishes repairs. We experimentally evaluated VulDebugger on 50 real-life projects. With 60.00% successfully fixed, VulDebugger significantly outperforms state-of-the-art approaches for vulnerability repair.

The integration of large language models (LLMs) into cyber security applications presents significant opportunities, such as enhancing threat analysis and malware detection, but can also introduce critical risks and safety concerns, including personal data leakage and automated generation of new malware. To address these challenges, we developed CyberLLMInstruct, a dataset of 54,928 instruction-response pairs spanning cyber security tasks such as malware analysis, phishing simulations, and zero-day vulnerabilities. The dataset was constructed through a multi-stage process. This involved sourcing data from multiple resources, filtering and structuring it into instruction-response pairs, and aligning it with real-world scenarios to enhance its applicability. Seven open-source LLMs were chosen to test the usefulness of CyberLLMInstruct: Phi 3 Mini 3.8B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 2.5 7B, Llama 3 8B, Llama 3.1 8B, Gemma 2 9B, and Llama 2 70B. In our primary example, we rigorously assess the safety of fine-tuned models using the OWASP top 10 framework, finding that fine-tuning reduces safety resilience across all tested LLMs and every adversarial attack (e.g., the security score of Llama 3.1 8B against prompt injection drops from 0.95 to 0.15). In our second example, we show that these same fine-tuned models can also achieve up to 92.50 percent accuracy on the CyberMetric benchmark. These findings highlight a trade-off between performance and safety, showing the importance of adversarial testing and further research into fine-tuning methodologies that can mitigate safety risks while still improving performance across diverse datasets and domains. The dataset creation pipeline, along with comprehensive documentation, examples, and resources for reproducing our results, is publicly available at https://github.com/Adelsamir01/CyberLLMInstruct.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents, which integrate planning, memory, reflection, and tool-use modules, have shown promise in solving complex, multi-step tasks. Yet their sophisticated architectures amplify vulnerability to cascading failures, where a single root-cause error propagates through subsequent decisions, leading to task failure. Current systems lack a framework that can comprehensively understand agent error in a modular and systemic way, and therefore fail to detect these errors accordingly. We address this gap with three contributions. First, we introduce the AgentErrorTaxonomy, a modular classification of failure modes spanning memory, reflection, planning, action, and system-level operations. Second, we construct AgentErrorBench, the first dataset of systematically annotated failure trajectories from ALFWorld, GAIA, and WebShop, grounding error analysis in real-world agent rollouts. Third, we propose AgentDebug, a debugging framework that isolates root-cause failures and provides corrective feedback, enabling agents to recover and iteratively improve. Experiments on AgentErrorBench show that AgentDebug achieves 24% higher all-correct accuracy and 17% higher step accuracy compared to the strongest baseline. Beyond detection, the targeted feedback generated by AgentDebug enables LLM agents to iteratively recover from failures, yielding up to 26% relative improvements in task success across ALFWorld, GAIA, and WebShop. These results establish principled debugging as a pathway to more reliable and adaptive LLM agents. The code and data will be available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/AgentDebug

Safety, security, and compliance are essential requirements when aligning large language models (LLMs). However, many seemingly aligned LLMs are soon shown to be susceptible to jailbreak attacks. These attacks aim to circumvent the models' safety guardrails and security mechanisms by introducing jailbreak prompts into malicious queries. In response to these challenges, this paper introduces Defensive Prompt Patch (DPP), a novel prompt-based defense mechanism specifically designed to protect LLMs against such sophisticated jailbreak strategies. Unlike previous approaches, which have often compromised the utility of the model for the sake of safety, DPP is designed to achieve a minimal Attack Success Rate (ASR) while preserving the high utility of LLMs. Our method uses strategically designed interpretable suffix prompts that effectively thwart a wide range of standard and adaptive jailbreak techniques. Empirical results conducted on LLAMA-2-7B-Chat and Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2 models demonstrate the robustness and adaptability of DPP, showing significant reductions in ASR with negligible impact on utility. Our approach not only outperforms existing defense strategies in balancing safety and functionality, but also provides a scalable and interpretable solution applicable to various LLM platforms.

Software vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows and SQL injections are a major source of security breaches. Traditional methods for vulnerability detection remain essential but are limited by high false positive rates, scalability issues, and reliance on manual effort. These constraints have driven interest in AI-based approaches to automated vulnerability detection and secure code generation. While Large Language Models (LLMs) have opened new avenues for classification tasks, their complexity and opacity pose challenges for interpretability and deployment. Sparse Autoencoder offer a promising solution to this problem. We explore whether SAEs can serve as a lightweight, interpretable alternative for bug detection in Java functions. We evaluate the effectiveness of SAEs when applied to representations from GPT-2 Small and Gemma 2B, examining their capacity to highlight buggy behaviour without fine-tuning the underlying LLMs. We found that SAE-derived features enable bug detection with an F1 score of up to 89%, consistently outperforming fine-tuned transformer encoder baselines. Our work provides the first empirical evidence that SAEs can be used to detect software bugs directly from the internal representations of pretrained LLMs, without any fine-tuning or task-specific supervision.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are trained with safety alignment to prevent generating malicious content. Although some attacks have highlighted vulnerabilities in these safety-aligned LLMs, they typically have limitations, such as necessitating access to the model weights or the generation process. Since proprietary models through API-calling do not grant users such permissions, these attacks find it challenging to compromise them. In this paper, we propose Jailbreaking Using LLM Introspection (JULI), which jailbreaks LLMs by manipulating the token log probabilities, using a tiny plug-in block, BiasNet. JULI relies solely on the knowledge of the target LLM's predicted token log probabilities. It can effectively jailbreak API-calling LLMs under a black-box setting and knowing only top-5 token log probabilities. Our approach demonstrates superior effectiveness, outperforming existing state-of-the-art (SOTA) approaches across multiple metrics.

Rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) has achieved major advances in reasoning, planning, and function-calling capabilities. Multi-agentic collaborative frameworks using such LLMs place them at the center of solving software development-related tasks such as code generation. However, direct use of LLM generated code in production software development systems is problematic. The code could be unstable or erroneous and contain vulnerabilities such as data poisoning, malicious attacks, and hallucinations that could lead to widespread system malfunctions. This prohibits the adoption of LLM generated code in production AI systems where human code reviews and traditional secure testing tools are impractical or untrustworthy. In this paper, we discuss safety and reliability problems with the execution of LLM generated code and propose a Secure Transpiler and Executor of LLM-Generated Program (STELP), capable of executing LLM-generated code in a controlled and safe manner. STELP secures autonomous production AI systems involving code generation, filling the critical void left by the impracticality or limitations of traditional secure testing methodologies and human oversight. This includes applications such as headless code generation-execution and LLMs that produce executable code snippets as an action plan to be executed in real time. We contribute a human-validated dataset of insecure code snippets and benchmark our approach on publicly available datasets for correctness, safety, and latency. Our results demonstrate that our approach outperforms an existing method by a significant margin, particularly in its ability to safely execute risky code snippets. Warning: This paper contains malicious code snippets that should be run with caution.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly aided developers by generating or assisting in code writing, enhancing productivity across various tasks. While identifying incorrect code is often straightforward, detecting vulnerabilities in functionally correct code is more challenging, especially for developers with limited security knowledge, which poses considerable security risks of using LLM-generated code and underscores the need for robust evaluation benchmarks that assess both functional correctness and security. Current benchmarks like CyberSecEval and SecurityEval attempt to solve it but are hindered by unclear and impractical specifications, failing to assess both functionality and security accurately. To tackle these deficiencies, we introduce CWEval, a novel outcome-driven evaluation framework designed to enhance the evaluation of secure code generation by LLMs. This framework not only assesses code functionality but also its security simultaneously with high-quality task specifications and outcome-driven test oracles which provides high accuracy. Coupled with CWEval-bench, a multilingual, security-critical coding benchmark, CWEval provides a rigorous empirical security evaluation on LLM-generated code, overcoming previous benchmarks' shortcomings. Through our evaluations, CWEval reveals a notable portion of functional but insecure code produced by LLMs, and shows a serious inaccuracy of previous evaluations, ultimately contributing significantly to the field of secure code generation. We open-source our artifact at: https://github.com/Co1lin/CWEval .

The proficiency of Large Language Models (LLMs) in processing structured data and adhering to syntactic rules is a capability that drives their widespread adoption but also makes them paradoxically vulnerable. In this paper, we investigate this vulnerability through BreakFun, a jailbreak methodology that weaponizes an LLM's adherence to structured schemas. BreakFun employs a three-part prompt that combines an innocent framing and a Chain-of-Thought distraction with a core "Trojan Schema"--a carefully crafted data structure that compels the model to generate harmful content, exploiting the LLM's strong tendency to follow structures and schemas. We demonstrate this vulnerability is highly transferable, achieving an average success rate of 89% across 13 foundational and proprietary models on JailbreakBench, and reaching a 100% Attack Success Rate (ASR) on several prominent models. A rigorous ablation study confirms this Trojan Schema is the attack's primary causal factor. To counter this, we introduce the Adversarial Prompt Deconstruction guardrail, a defense that utilizes a secondary LLM to perform a "Literal Transcription"--extracting all human-readable text to isolate and reveal the user's true harmful intent. Our proof-of-concept guardrail demonstrates high efficacy against the attack, validating that targeting the deceptive schema is a viable mitigation strategy. Our work provides a look into how an LLM's core strengths can be turned into critical weaknesses, offering a fresh perspective for building more robustly aligned models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive capabilities in downstream software engineering tasks such as Automated Program Repair (APR). In particular, there has been a lot of research on repository-level issue-resolution benchmarks such as SWE-Bench. Although there has been significant progress on this topic, we notice that in the process of solving such issues, existing agentic systems tend to hyper-localize on immediately suspicious lines of code and fix them in isolation, without a deeper understanding of the issue semantics, code semantics, or execution semantics. Consequently, many existing systems generate patches that overfit to the user issue, even when a more general fix is preferable. To address this limitation, we introduce SemAgent, a novel workflow-based procedure that leverages issue, code, and execution semantics to generate patches that are complete - identifying and fixing all lines relevant to the issue. We achieve this through a novel pipeline that (a) leverages execution semantics to retrieve relevant context, (b) comprehends issue-semantics via generalized abstraction, (c) isolates code-semantics within the context of this abstraction, and (d) leverages this understanding in a two-stage architecture: a repair stage that proposes fine-grained fixes, followed by a reviewer stage that filters relevant fixes based on the inferred issue-semantics. Our evaluations show that our methodology achieves a solve rate of 44.66% on the SWEBench-Lite benchmark beating all other workflow-based approaches, and an absolute improvement of 7.66% compared to our baseline, which lacks such deep semantic understanding. We note that our approach performs particularly well on issues requiring multi-line reasoning (and editing) and edge-case handling, suggesting that incorporating issue and code semantics into APR pipelines can lead to robust and semantically consistent repairs.

Large language models (LLMs), such as OpenAI's Codex, have demonstrated their potential to generate code from natural language descriptions across a wide range of programming tasks. Several benchmarks have recently emerged to evaluate the ability of LLMs to generate functionally correct code from natural language intent with respect to a set of hidden test cases. This has enabled the research community to identify significant and reproducible advancements in LLM capabilities. However, there is currently a lack of benchmark datasets for assessing the ability of LLMs to generate functionally correct code edits based on natural language descriptions of intended changes. This paper aims to address this gap by motivating the problem NL2Fix of translating natural language descriptions of code changes (namely bug fixes described in Issue reports in repositories) into correct code fixes. To this end, we introduce Defects4J-NL2Fix, a dataset of 283 Java programs from the popular Defects4J dataset augmented with high-level descriptions of bug fixes, and empirically evaluate the performance of several state-of-the-art LLMs for the this task. Results show that these LLMS together are capable of generating plausible fixes for 64.6% of the bugs, and the best LLM-based technique can achieve up to 21.20% top-1 and 35.68% top-5 accuracy on this benchmark.

This study systematically analyzes the vulnerability of 36 large language models (LLMs) to various prompt injection attacks, a technique that leverages carefully crafted prompts to elicit malicious LLM behavior. Across 144 prompt injection tests, we observed a strong correlation between model parameters and vulnerability, with statistical analyses, such as logistic regression and random forest feature analysis, indicating that parameter size and architecture significantly influence susceptibility. Results revealed that 56 percent of tests led to successful prompt injections, emphasizing widespread vulnerability across various parameter sizes, with clustering analysis identifying distinct vulnerability profiles associated with specific model configurations. Additionally, our analysis uncovered correlations between certain prompt injection techniques, suggesting potential overlaps in vulnerabilities. These findings underscore the urgent need for robust, multi-layered defenses in LLMs deployed across critical infrastructure and sensitive industries. Successful prompt injection attacks could result in severe consequences, including data breaches, unauthorized access, or misinformation. Future research should explore multilingual and multi-step defenses alongside adaptive mitigation strategies to strengthen LLM security in diverse, real-world environments.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable capabilities but remain vulnerable to adversarial prompts known as jailbreaks, which can bypass safety alignment and elicit harmful outputs. Despite growing efforts in LLM safety research, existing evaluations are often fragmented, focused on isolated attack or defense techniques, and lack systematic, reproducible analysis. In this work, we introduce PandaGuard, a unified and modular framework that models LLM jailbreak safety as a multi-agent system comprising attackers, defenders, and judges. Our framework implements 19 attack methods and 12 defense mechanisms, along with multiple judgment strategies, all within a flexible plugin architecture supporting diverse LLM interfaces, multiple interaction modes, and configuration-driven experimentation that enhances reproducibility and practical deployment. Built on this framework, we develop PandaBench, a comprehensive benchmark that evaluates the interactions between these attack/defense methods across 49 LLMs and various judgment approaches, requiring over 3 billion tokens to execute. Our extensive evaluation reveals key insights into model vulnerabilities, defense cost-performance trade-offs, and judge consistency. We find that no single defense is optimal across all dimensions and that judge disagreement introduces nontrivial variance in safety assessments. We release the code, configurations, and evaluation results to support transparent and reproducible research in LLM safety.

Prompt leakage poses a compelling security and privacy threat in LLM applications. Leakage of system prompts may compromise intellectual property, and act as adversarial reconnaissance for an attacker. A systematic evaluation of prompt leakage threats and mitigation strategies is lacking, especially for multi-turn LLM interactions. In this paper, we systematically investigate LLM vulnerabilities against prompt leakage for 10 closed- and open-source LLMs, across four domains. We design a unique threat model which leverages the LLM sycophancy effect and elevates the average attack success rate (ASR) from 17.7% to 86.2% in a multi-turn setting. Our standardized setup further allows dissecting leakage of specific prompt contents such as task instructions and knowledge documents. We measure the mitigation effect of 7 black-box defense strategies, along with finetuning an open-source model to defend against leakage attempts. We present different combination of defenses against our threat model, including a cost analysis. Our study highlights key takeaways for building secure LLM applications and provides directions for research in multi-turn LLM interactions

A high volume of recent ML security literature focuses on attacks against aligned large language models (LLMs). These attacks may extract private information or coerce the model into producing harmful outputs. In real-world deployments, LLMs are often part of a larger agentic pipeline including memory systems, retrieval, web access, and API calling. Such additional components introduce vulnerabilities that make these LLM-powered agents much easier to attack than isolated LLMs, yet relatively little work focuses on the security of LLM agents. In this paper, we analyze security and privacy vulnerabilities that are unique to LLM agents. We first provide a taxonomy of attacks categorized by threat actors, objectives, entry points, attacker observability, attack strategies, and inherent vulnerabilities of agent pipelines. We then conduct a series of illustrative attacks on popular open-source and commercial agents, demonstrating the immediate practical implications of their vulnerabilities. Notably, our attacks are trivial to implement and require no understanding of machine learning.

This paper provides a comprehensive review of the future of cybersecurity through Generative AI and Large Language Models (LLMs). We explore LLM applications across various domains, including hardware design security, intrusion detection, software engineering, design verification, cyber threat intelligence, malware detection, and phishing detection. We present an overview of LLM evolution and its current state, focusing on advancements in models such as GPT-4, GPT-3.5, Mixtral-8x7B, BERT, Falcon2, and LLaMA. Our analysis extends to LLM vulnerabilities, such as prompt injection, insecure output handling, data poisoning, DDoS attacks, and adversarial instructions. We delve into mitigation strategies to protect these models, providing a comprehensive look at potential attack scenarios and prevention techniques. Furthermore, we evaluate the performance of 42 LLM models in cybersecurity knowledge and hardware security, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. We thoroughly evaluate cybersecurity datasets for LLM training and testing, covering the lifecycle from data creation to usage and identifying gaps for future research. In addition, we review new strategies for leveraging LLMs, including techniques like Half-Quadratic Quantization (HQQ), Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF), Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), Quantized Low-Rank Adapters (QLoRA), and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG). These insights aim to enhance real-time cybersecurity defenses and improve the sophistication of LLM applications in threat detection and response. Our paper provides a foundational understanding and strategic direction for integrating LLMs into future cybersecurity frameworks, emphasizing innovation and robust model deployment to safeguard against evolving cyber threats.

We propose and release a new vulnerable source code dataset. We curate the dataset by crawling security issue websites, extracting vulnerability-fixing commits and source codes from the corresponding projects. Our new dataset contains 18,945 vulnerable functions spanning 150 CWEs and 330,492 non-vulnerable functions extracted from 7,514 commits. Our dataset covers 295 more projects than all previous datasets combined. Combining our new dataset with previous datasets, we present an analysis of the challenges and promising research directions of using deep learning for detecting software vulnerabilities. We study 11 model architectures belonging to 4 families. Our results show that deep learning is still not ready for vulnerability detection, due to high false positive rate, low F1 score, and difficulty of detecting hard CWEs. In particular, we demonstrate an important generalization challenge for the deployment of deep learning-based models. We show that increasing the volume of training data may not further improve the performance of deep learning models for vulnerability detection, but might be useful to improve the generalization ability to unseen projects. We also identify hopeful future research directions. We demonstrate that large language models (LLMs) are a promising research direction for ML-based vulnerability detection, outperforming Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) with code-structure features in our experiments. Moreover, developing source code specific pre-training objectives is a promising research direction to improve the vulnerability detection performance.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in code generation, achieving high scores on benchmarks such as HumanEval and MBPP. However, these benchmarks primarily assess functional correctness and neglect broader dimensions of code quality, including security, reliability, readability, and maintainability. In this work, we systematically evaluate the ability of LLMs to generate high-quality code across multiple dimensions using the PythonSecurityEval benchmark. We introduce an iterative static analysis-driven prompting algorithm that leverages Bandit and Pylint to identify and resolve code quality issues. Our experiments with GPT-4o show substantial improvements: security issues reduced from >40% to 13%, readability violations from >80% to 11%, and reliability warnings from >50% to 11% within ten iterations. These results demonstrate that LLMs, when guided by static analysis feedback, can significantly enhance code quality beyond functional correctness.

Automated vulnerability reproduction from CVE descriptions requires generating executable Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploits and validating them in target environments. This process is critical in software security research and practice, yet remains time-consuming and demands specialized expertise when performed manually. While LLM agents show promise for automating this task, existing approaches often conflate exploring attack directions with fixing implementation details, which leads to unproductive debugging loops when reproduction fails. To address this, we propose CVE2PoC, an LLM-based dual-loop agent framework following a plan-execute-evaluate paradigm. The Strategic Planner analyzes vulnerability semantics and target code to produce structured attack plans. The Tactical Executor generates PoC code and validates it through progressive verification. The Adaptive Refiner evaluates execution results and routes failures to different loops: the Tactical Loop for code-level refinement, while the Strategic Loop for attack strategy replanning. This dual-loop design enables the framework to escape ineffective debugging by matching remediation to failure type. Evaluation on two benchmarks covering 617 real-world vulnerabilities demonstrates that CVE2PoC achieves 82.9% and 54.3% reproduction success rates on SecBench.js and PatchEval, respectively, outperforming the best baseline by 11.3% and 20.4%. Human evaluation confirms that generated PoCs achieve comparable code quality to human-written exploits in readability and reusability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed software development and automated code generation. Motivated by these advancements, this paper explores the feasibility of LLMs in modifying malware source code to generate variants. We introduce LLMalMorph, a semi-automated framework that leverages semantical and syntactical code comprehension by LLMs to generate new malware variants. LLMalMorph extracts function-level information from the malware source code and employs custom-engineered prompts coupled with strategically defined code transformations to guide the LLM in generating variants without resource-intensive fine-tuning. To evaluate LLMalMorph, we collected 10 diverse Windows malware samples of varying types, complexity and functionality and generated 618 variants. Our thorough experiments demonstrate that it is possible to reduce the detection rates of antivirus engines of these malware variants to some extent while preserving malware functionalities. In addition, despite not optimizing against any Machine Learning (ML)-based malware detectors, several variants also achieved notable attack success rates against an ML-based malware classifier. We also discuss the limitations of current LLM capabilities in generating malware variants from source code and assess where this emerging technology stands in the broader context of malware variant generation.

Software testing and verification are critical for ensuring the reliability and security of modern software systems. Traditionally, formal verification techniques, such as model checking and theorem proving, have provided rigorous frameworks for detecting bugs and vulnerabilities. However, these methods often face scalability challenges when applied to complex, real-world programs. Recently, the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has introduced a new paradigm for software analysis, leveraging their ability to understand insecure coding practices. Although LLMs demonstrate promising capabilities in tasks such as bug prediction and invariant generation, they lack the formal guarantees of classical methods. This paper presents a comprehensive study of state-of-the-art software testing and verification, focusing on three key approaches: classical formal methods, LLM-based analysis, and emerging hybrid techniques, which combine their strengths. We explore each approach's strengths, limitations, and practical applications, highlighting the potential of hybrid systems to address the weaknesses of standalone methods. We analyze whether integrating formal rigor with LLM-driven insights can enhance the effectiveness and scalability of software verification, exploring their viability as a pathway toward more robust and adaptive testing frameworks.

Penetration testing, an essential component of software security testing, allows organizations to identify and remediate vulnerabilities in their systems, thus bolstering their defense mechanisms against cyberattacks. One recent advancement in the realm of penetration testing is the utilization of Language Models (LLMs). We explore the intersection of LLMs and penetration testing to gain insight into their capabilities and challenges in the context of privilege escalation. We introduce a fully automated privilege-escalation tool designed for evaluating the efficacy of LLMs for (ethical) hacking, executing benchmarks using multiple LLMs, and investigating their respective results. Our results show that GPT-4-turbo is well suited to exploit vulnerabilities (33-83% of vulnerabilities). GPT-3.5-turbo can abuse 16-50% of vulnerabilities, while local models, such as Llama3, can only exploit between 0 and 33% of the vulnerabilities. We analyze the impact of different context sizes, in-context learning, optional high-level guidance mechanisms, and memory management techniques. We discuss challenging areas for LLMs, including maintaining focus during testing, coping with errors, and finally comparing LLMs with human hackers. The current version of the LLM-guided privilege-escalation prototype can be found at https://github.com/ipa-labs/hackingBuddyGPT.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed numerous fields by enabling advanced natural language interactions but remain susceptible to critical vulnerabilities, particularly jailbreak attacks. Current jailbreak techniques, while effective, often depend on input modifications, making them detectable and limiting their stealth and scalability. This paper presents Targeted Model Editing (TME), a novel white-box approach that bypasses safety filters by minimally altering internal model structures while preserving the model's intended functionalities. TME identifies and removes safety-critical transformations (SCTs) embedded in model matrices, enabling malicious queries to bypass restrictions without input modifications. By analyzing distinct activation patterns between safe and unsafe queries, TME isolates and approximates SCTs through an optimization process. Implemented in the D-LLM framework, our method achieves an average Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 84.86% on four mainstream open-source LLMs, maintaining high performance. Unlike existing methods, D-LLM eliminates the need for specific triggers or harmful response collections, offering a stealthier and more effective jailbreak strategy. This work reveals a covert and robust threat vector in LLM security and emphasizes the need for stronger safeguards in model safety alignment.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently shown strong potential for Automated Program Repair (APR), yet most existing approaches remain unimodal and fail to leverage the rich diagnostic signals contained in visual artifacts such as screenshots and control-flow graphs. In practice, many bug reports convey critical information visually (e.g., layout breakage or missing widgets), but directly using such dense visual inputs often causes context loss and noise, making it difficult for MLLMs to ground visual observations into precise fault localization and executable patches. To bridge this semantic gap, we propose SVRepair, a multimodal APR framework with structured visual representation. SVRepair first fine-tunes a vision-language model, Structured Visual Representation (SVR), to uniformly transform heterogeneous visual artifacts into a semantic scene graph that captures GUI elements and their structural relations (e.g., hierarchy), providing normalized, code-relevant context for downstream repair. Building on the graph, SVRepair drives a coding agent to localize faults and synthesize patches, and further introduces an iterative visual-artifact segmentation strategy that progressively narrows the input to bug-centered regions to suppress irrelevant context and reduce hallucinations. Extensive experiments across multiple benchmarks demonstrate state-of-the-art performance: SVRepair achieves 36.47\% accuracy on SWE-Bench M, 38.02\% on MMCode, and 95.12\% on CodeVision, validating the effectiveness of SVRepair for multimodal program repair.

Large Language models (LLMs) can generate complicated source code from natural language prompts. However, LLMs can generate output that deviates from what the user wants, requiring supervision and editing. To support this process, we offer techniques to localize where generations might be misaligned from user intent. We first create a dataset of "Minimal Intent Aligning Patches" of repaired LLM generated programs. Each program uses test cases to verify correctness. After creating a dataset of programs, we measure how well various techniques can assign a well-calibrated probability to indicate which parts of code will be edited in a minimal patch (i.e., give a probability that corresponds with empirical odds it is edited). We compare white-box probing (where we propose a technique for efficient arbitrary-span querying), against black-box reflective and self-consistency based approaches. We find probes with a small supervisor model can achieve low calibration error and Brier Skill Score of approx 0.2 estimating edited lines on code generated by models many orders of magnitude larger. We discuss the generalizability of the techniques, and the connections to AI oversight and control, finding a probe trained only on code shows some signs of generalizing to natural language errors if new probability scaling is allowed.

Large Language Models (LLMs) enable a new ecosystem with many downstream applications, called LLM applications, with different natural language processing tasks. The functionality and performance of an LLM application highly depend on its system prompt, which instructs the backend LLM on what task to perform. Therefore, an LLM application developer often keeps a system prompt confidential to protect its intellectual property. As a result, a natural attack, called prompt leaking, is to steal the system prompt from an LLM application, which compromises the developer's intellectual property. Existing prompt leaking attacks primarily rely on manually crafted queries, and thus achieve limited effectiveness. In this paper, we design a novel, closed-box prompt leaking attack framework, called PLeak, to optimize an adversarial query such that when the attacker sends it to a target LLM application, its response reveals its own system prompt. We formulate finding such an adversarial query as an optimization problem and solve it with a gradient-based method approximately. Our key idea is to break down the optimization goal by optimizing adversary queries for system prompts incrementally, i.e., starting from the first few tokens of each system prompt step by step until the entire length of the system prompt. We evaluate PLeak in both offline settings and for real-world LLM applications, e.g., those on Poe, a popular platform hosting such applications. Our results show that PLeak can effectively leak system prompts and significantly outperforms not only baselines that manually curate queries but also baselines with optimized queries that are modified and adapted from existing jailbreaking attacks. We responsibly reported the issues to Poe and are still waiting for their response. Our implementation is available at this repository: https://github.com/BHui97/PLeak.

Ensuring faithful interpretability in large language models is imperative for trustworthy and reliable AI. A key obstacle is self-repair, a phenomenon where networks compensate for reduced signal in one component by amplifying others, masking the true importance of the ablated component. While prior work attributes self-repair to layer normalization and back-up components that compensate for ablated components, we identify a novel form occurring within the attention mechanism, where softmax redistribution conceals the influence of important attention scores. This leads traditional ablation and gradient-based methods to underestimate the significance of all components contributing to these attention scores. We introduce Gradient Interaction Modifications (GIM), a technique that accounts for self-repair during backpropagation. Extensive experiments across multiple large language models (Gemma 2B/9B, LLAMA 1B/3B/8B, Qwen 1.5B/3B) and diverse tasks demonstrate that GIM significantly improves faithfulness over existing circuit identification and feature attribution methods. Our work is a significant step toward better understanding the inner mechanisms of LLMs, which is crucial for improving them and ensuring their safety. Our code is available at https://github.com/JoakimEdin/gim.

Patch backporting, the process of migrating mainline security patches to older branches, is an essential task in maintaining popular open-source projects (e.g., Linux kernel). However, manual backporting can be labor-intensive, while existing automated methods, which heavily rely on predefined syntax or semantic rules, often lack agility for complex patches. In this paper, we introduce PORTGPT, an LLM-agent for end-to-end automation of patch backporting in real-world scenarios. PORTGPT enhances an LLM with tools to access code on-demand, summarize Git history, and revise patches autonomously based on feedback (e.g., from compilers), hence, simulating human-like reasoning and verification. PORTGPT achieved an 89.15% success rate on existing datasets (1815 cases), and 62.33% on our own dataset of 146 complex cases, both outperforms state-of-the-art of backporting tools. We contributed 9 backported patches from PORTGPT to the Linux kernel community and all patches are now merged.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are being increasingly used in software engineering tasks, with an increased focus on bug report resolution over the past year. However, most proposed systems fail to properly handle uncertain or incorrect inputs and outputs. Existing LLM-based tools and coding agents respond to every issue and generate a patch for every case, even when the input is vague or their own output is incorrect. There are no mechanisms in place to abstain when confidence is low. This leads to unreliable behaviour, such as hallucinated code changes or responses based on vague issue reports. We introduce BouncerBench, a benchmark that evaluates whether LLM-based software agents can refuse to act when inputs are ill-defined or refuse to respond when their own outputs are likely to be incorrect. Unlike prior benchmarks that implicitly incentivize models to generate responses even when uncertain, BouncerBench aims to improve precision by targeting two overlooked failure points: (1) vague or underspecified issue descriptions in tickets and (2) logically or functionally incorrect code patches created by the system. It measures whether proposed systems can distinguish actionable issues from vague tickets and valid patches from untrustworthy ones. We also implement a basic input and output bouncer, evaluating how well current LLMs can abstain when needed. Our results show that most models fail to abstain from underspecified inputs or incorrect outputs. Hence, we conclude that there is significant room for improvement before LLMs can be trusted to make correct decisions and recommendations in real-world software engineering workflows. BouncerBench provides a first step toward evaluating and building more cautious, trustworthy code agents. The replication package, dataset, and leaderboard can be found at bouncerbench.com

With the rise of large language models (LLMs), researchers are increasingly exploring their applications in var ious vertical domains, such as software engineering. LLMs have achieved remarkable success in areas including code generation and vulnerability detection. However, they also exhibit numerous limitations and shortcomings. LLM-based agents, a novel tech nology with the potential for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), combine LLMs as the core for decision-making and action-taking, addressing some of the inherent limitations of LLMs such as lack of autonomy and self-improvement. Despite numerous studies and surveys exploring the possibility of using LLMs in software engineering, it lacks a clear distinction between LLMs and LLM based agents. It is still in its early stage for a unified standard and benchmarking to qualify an LLM solution as an LLM-based agent in its domain. In this survey, we broadly investigate the current practice and solutions for LLMs and LLM-based agents for software engineering. In particular we summarise six key topics: requirement engineering, code generation, autonomous decision-making, software design, test generation, and software maintenance. We review and differentiate the work of LLMs and LLM-based agents from these six topics, examining their differences and similarities in tasks, benchmarks, and evaluation metrics. Finally, we discuss the models and benchmarks used, providing a comprehensive analysis of their applications and effectiveness in software engineering. We anticipate this work will shed some lights on pushing the boundaries of LLM-based agents in software engineering for future research.

Evaluations of large language model (LLM) risks and capabilities are increasingly being incorporated into AI risk management and governance frameworks. Currently, most risk evaluations are conducted by designing inputs that elicit harmful behaviors from the system. However, a fundamental limitation of this approach is that the harmfulness of the behaviors identified during any particular evaluation can only lower bound the model's worst-possible-case behavior. As a complementary method for eliciting harmful behaviors, we propose evaluating LLMs with model tampering attacks which allow for modifications to latent activations or weights. We pit state-of-the-art techniques for removing harmful LLM capabilities against a suite of 5 input-space and 6 model tampering attacks. In addition to benchmarking these methods against each other, we show that (1) model resilience to capability elicitation attacks lies on a low-dimensional robustness subspace; (2) the attack success rate of model tampering attacks can empirically predict and offer conservative estimates for the success of held-out input-space attacks; and (3) state-of-the-art unlearning methods can easily be undone within 16 steps of fine-tuning. Together these results highlight the difficulty of removing harmful LLM capabilities and show that model tampering attacks enable substantially more rigorous evaluations than input-space attacks alone. We release models at https://huggingface.co/LLM-GAT

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly integrate native code interpreters, they enable powerful real-time execution capabilities, substantially expanding their utility. However, such integrations introduce potential system-level cybersecurity threats, fundamentally different from prompt-based vulnerabilities. To systematically evaluate these interpreter-specific risks, we propose CIRCLE (Code-Interpreter Resilience Check for LLM Exploits), a simple benchmark comprising 1,260 prompts targeting CPU, memory, and disk resource exhaustion. Each risk category includes explicitly malicious ("direct") and plausibly benign ("indirect") prompt variants. Our automated evaluation framework assesses not only whether LLMs refuse or generates risky code, but also executes the generated code within the interpreter environment to evaluate code correctness, simplifications made by the LLM to make the code safe, or execution timeouts. Evaluating 7 commercially available models from OpenAI and Google, we uncover significant and inconsistent vulnerabilities. For instance, evaluations show substantial disparities even within providers - OpenAI's o4-mini correctly refuses risky requests at 7.1%, notably higher rates compared to GPT-4.1 at 0.5%. Results particularly underscore that indirect, socially-engineered prompts substantially weaken model defenses. This highlights an urgent need for interpreter-specific cybersecurity benchmarks, dedicated mitigation tools (e.g., guardrails), and clear industry standards to guide safe and responsible deployment of LLM interpreter integrations. The benchmark dataset and evaluation code are publicly released to foster further research.

Large language models frequently fail to produce correct code on their first attempt, yet most benchmarks evaluate them in a single-shot setting. We investigate iterative self-repair (feeding execution errors back to the model for correction) across seven models spanning three families and both open-weight and proprietary providers: Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.3 70B, Llama 4 Scout (MoE, 16 experts), Llama 4 Maverick (MoE, 128 experts), Qwen3 32B, Gemini 2.5 Flash, and Gemini 2.5 Pro. On HumanEval (164 problems) and MBPP Sanitized (257 problems) with up to five attempts, self-repair universally improves pass rates: +4.9 to +17.1 pp on HumanEval and +16.0 to +30.0 pp on MBPP. Gemini 2.5 Flash achieves the highest final pass rates (96.3% HumanEval, 93.8% MBPP). Most gains concentrate in the first two rounds.Error-type analysis shows assertion errors (logical mistakes) are the hardest to repair at ~45%, while syntax and name errors are repaired at substantially higher rates, connecting to broader findings on the limits of LLM self-correction. Prior work found that weaker models fail at self-repair or require fine-tuning; we show that modern instruction-tuned models succeed with prompting alone, even at 8B scale. We also provide the first comparison of dense and MoE architectures for self-repair, and extend the repair-vs-resampling tradeoff analysis to modern models. A prompt ablation reveals chain-of-thought repair yields up to +5.5 pp additional self-repair gain (measured as improvement in repair delta) over minimal prompting for capable models.