Daily Papers

We question the current evaluation practice on diffusion-based purification methods. Diffusion-based purification methods aim to remove adversarial effects from an input data point at test time. The approach gains increasing attention as an alternative to adversarial training due to the disentangling between training and testing. Well-known white-box attacks are often employed to measure the robustness of the purification. However, it is unknown whether these attacks are the most effective for the diffusion-based purification since the attacks are often tailored for adversarial training. We analyze the current practices and provide a new guideline for measuring the robustness of purification methods against adversarial attacks. Based on our analysis, we further propose a new purification strategy improving robustness compared to the current diffusion-based purification methods.

Text-to-image diffusion models have revolutionized generative AI, but their vulnerability to backdoor attacks poses significant security risks. Adversaries can inject imperceptible textual triggers into training data, causing models to generate manipulated outputs. Although text-based backdoor defenses in classification models are well-explored, generative models lack effective mitigation techniques against. We address this by selectively erasing the model's learned associations between adversarial text triggers and poisoned outputs, while preserving overall generation quality. Our approach, Self-Knowledge Distillation with Cross-Attention Guidance (SKD-CAG), uses knowledge distillation to guide the model in correcting responses to poisoned prompts while maintaining image quality by exploiting the fact that the backdoored model still produces clean outputs in the absence of triggers. Using the cross-attention mechanism, SKD-CAG neutralizes backdoor influences at the attention level, ensuring the targeted removal of adversarial effects. Extensive experiments show that our method outperforms existing approaches, achieving removal accuracy 100\% for pixel backdoors and 93\% for style-based attacks, without sacrificing robustness or image fidelity. Our findings highlight targeted unlearning as a promising defense to secure generative models. Code and model weights can be found at https://github.com/Mystic-Slice/Sealing-The-Backdoor .

We investigate whether pre-training exclusively on dialogue data results in formally and functionally apt small language models. Based on this pre-trained llamalogue model, we employ a variety of fine-tuning strategies to enforce "more communicative" text generations by our models. Although our models underperform on most standard BabyLM benchmarks, they excel at dialogue continuation prediction in a minimal pair setting. While PPO fine-tuning has mixed to adversarial effects on our models, DPO fine-tuning further improves their performance on our custom dialogue benchmark.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

Adversarial examples derived from deliberately crafted perturbations on visual inputs can easily harm decision process of deep neural networks. To prevent potential threats, various adversarial training-based defense methods have grown rapidly and become a de facto standard approach for robustness. Despite recent competitive achievements, we observe that adversarial vulnerability varies across targets and certain vulnerabilities remain prevalent. Intriguingly, such peculiar phenomenon cannot be relieved even with deeper architectures and advanced defense methods. To address this issue, in this paper, we introduce a causal approach called Adversarial Double Machine Learning (ADML), which allows us to quantify the degree of adversarial vulnerability for network predictions and capture the effect of treatments on outcome of interests. ADML can directly estimate causal parameter of adversarial perturbations per se and mitigate negative effects that can potentially damage robustness, bridging a causal perspective into the adversarial vulnerability. Through extensive experiments on various CNN and Transformer architectures, we corroborate that ADML improves adversarial robustness with large margins and relieve the empirical observation.

With the perpetual increase of complexity of the state-of-the-art deep neural networks, it becomes a more and more challenging task to maintain their interpretability. Our work aims to evaluate the effects of adversarial training utilized to produce robust models - less vulnerable to adversarial attacks. It has been shown to make computer vision models more interpretable. Interpretability is as essential as robustness when we deploy the models to the real world. To prove the correlation between these two problems, we extensively examine the models using local feature-importance methods (SHAP, Integrated Gradients) and feature visualization techniques (Representation Inversion, Class Specific Image Generation). Standard models, compared to robust are more susceptible to adversarial attacks, and their learned representations are less meaningful to humans. Conversely, these models focus on distinctive regions of the images which support their predictions. Moreover, the features learned by the robust model are closer to the real ones.

Ensuring the quality and integrity of medical images is crucial for maintaining diagnostic accuracy in deep learning-based Computer-Aided Diagnosis and Computer-Aided Detection (CAD) systems. Covariate shifts are subtle variations in the data distribution caused by different imaging devices or settings and can severely degrade model performance, similar to the effects of adversarial attacks. Therefore, it is vital to have a lightweight and fast method to assess the quality of these images prior to using CAD models. AdverX-Ray addresses this need by serving as an image-quality assessment layer, designed to detect covariate shifts effectively. This Adversarial Variational Autoencoder prioritizes the discriminator's role, using the suboptimal outputs of the generator as negative samples to fine-tune the discriminator's ability to identify high-frequency artifacts. Images generated by adversarial networks often exhibit severe high-frequency artifacts, guiding the discriminator to focus excessively on these components. This makes the discriminator ideal for this approach. Trained on patches from X-ray images of specific machine models, AdverX-Ray can evaluate whether a scan matches the training distribution, or if a scan from the same machine is captured under different settings. Extensive comparisons with various OOD detection methods show that AdverX-Ray significantly outperforms existing techniques, achieving a 96.2% average AUROC using only 64 random patches from an X-ray. Its lightweight and fast architecture makes it suitable for real-time applications, enhancing the reliability of medical imaging systems. The code and pretrained models are publicly available.

In recent years generative adversarial networks (GANs) have been used to supplement datasets within the field of marine bioacoustics. This is driven by factors such as the cost to collect data, data sparsity and aid preprocessing. One notable challenge with marine bioacoustic data is the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) posing difficulty when applying deep learning techniques such as GANs. This work investigates the effect SNR has on the audio-based GAN performance and examines three different evaluation methodologies for GAN performance, yielding interesting results on the effects of SNR on GANs, specifically WaveGAN.

Footsteps are among the most ubiquitous sound effects in multimedia applications. There is substantial research into understanding the acoustic features and developing synthesis models for footstep sound effects. In this paper, we present a first attempt at adopting neural synthesis for this task. We implemented two GAN-based architectures and compared the results with real recordings as well as six traditional sound synthesis methods. Our architectures reached realism scores as high as recorded samples, showing encouraging results for the task at hand.

Adversarial training is exploited to develop a robust Deep Neural Network (DNN) model against the malicious altered data. These attacks may have catastrophic effects on DNN models but are indistinguishable for a human being. For example, an external attack can modify an image adding noises invisible for a human eye, but a DNN model misclassified the image. A key objective for developing robust DNN models is to use a learning algorithm that is fast but can also give model that is robust against different types of adversarial attacks. Especially for adversarial training, enormously long training times are needed for obtaining high accuracy under many different types of adversarial samples generated using different adversarial attack techniques. This paper aims at accelerating the adversarial training to enable fast development of robust DNN models against adversarial attacks. The general method for improving the training performance is the hyperparameters fine-tuning, where the learning rate is one of the most crucial hyperparameters. By modifying its shape (the value over time) and value during the training, we can obtain a model robust to adversarial attacks faster than standard training. First, we conduct experiments on two different datasets (CIFAR10, CIFAR100), exploring various techniques. Then, this analysis is leveraged to develop a novel fast training methodology, AccelAT, which automatically adjusts the learning rate for different epochs based on the accuracy gradient. The experiments show comparable results with the related works, and in several experiments, the adversarial training of DNNs using our AccelAT framework is conducted up to 2 times faster than the existing techniques. Thus, our findings boost the speed of adversarial training in an era in which security and performance are fundamental optimization objectives in DNN-based applications.

We demonstrate that a single 3x3 convolutional kernel can produce emergent audio effects when trained on 200 samples from a personalized corpus. We achieve this through two key techniques: (1) Conditioning Aware Kernels (CAK), where output = input + (learned_pattern x control), with a soft-gate mechanism supporting identity preservation at zero control; and (2) AuGAN (Audit GAN), which reframes adversarial training from "is this real?" to "did you apply the requested value?" Rather than learning to generate or detect forgeries, our networks cooperate to verify control application, discovering unique transformations. The learned kernel exhibits a diagonal structure creating frequency-dependent temporal shifts that are capable of producing musical effects based on input characteristics. Our results show the potential of adversarial training to discover audio transformations from minimal data, enabling new approaches to effect design.

Despite the recent success of reinforcement learning in various domains, these approaches remain, for the most part, deterringly sensitive to hyper-parameters and are often riddled with essential engineering feats allowing their success. We consider the case of off-policy generative adversarial imitation learning, and perform an in-depth review, qualitative and quantitative, of the method. We show that forcing the learned reward function to be local Lipschitz-continuous is a sine qua non condition for the method to perform well. We then study the effects of this necessary condition and provide several theoretical results involving the local Lipschitzness of the state-value function. We complement these guarantees with empirical evidence attesting to the strong positive effect that the consistent satisfaction of the Lipschitzness constraint on the reward has on imitation performance. Finally, we tackle a generic pessimistic reward preconditioning add-on spawning a large class of reward shaping methods, which makes the base method it is plugged into provably more robust, as shown in several additional theoretical guarantees. We then discuss these through a fine-grained lens and share our insights. Crucially, the guarantees derived and reported in this work are valid for any reward satisfying the Lipschitzness condition, nothing is specific to imitation. As such, these may be of independent interest.

We interpret the function of individual neurons in CLIP by automatically describing them using text. Analyzing the direct effects (i.e. the flow from a neuron through the residual stream to the output) or the indirect effects (overall contribution) fails to capture the neurons' function in CLIP. Therefore, we present the "second-order lens", analyzing the effect flowing from a neuron through the later attention heads, directly to the output. We find that these effects are highly selective: for each neuron, the effect is significant for <2% of the images. Moreover, each effect can be approximated by a single direction in the text-image space of CLIP. We describe neurons by decomposing these directions into sparse sets of text representations. The sets reveal polysemantic behavior - each neuron corresponds to multiple, often unrelated, concepts (e.g. ships and cars). Exploiting this neuron polysemy, we mass-produce "semantic" adversarial examples by generating images with concepts spuriously correlated to the incorrect class. Additionally, we use the second-order effects for zero-shot segmentation and attribute discovery in images. Our results indicate that a scalable understanding of neurons can be used for model deception and for introducing new model capabilities.

It is becoming increasingly clear that many machine learning classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial examples. In attempting to explain the origin of adversarial examples, previous studies have typically focused on the fact that neural networks operate on high dimensional data, they overfit, or they are too linear. Here we argue that the origin of adversarial examples is primarily due to an inherent uncertainty that neural networks have about their predictions. We show that the functional form of this uncertainty is independent of architecture, dataset, and training protocol; and depends only on the statistics of the logit differences of the network, which do not change significantly during training. This leads to adversarial error having a universal scaling, as a power-law, with respect to the size of the adversarial perturbation. We show that this universality holds for a broad range of datasets (MNIST, CIFAR10, ImageNet, and random data), models (including state-of-the-art deep networks, linear models, adversarially trained networks, and networks trained on randomly shuffled labels), and attacks (FGSM, step l.l., PGD). Motivated by these results, we study the effects of reducing prediction entropy on adversarial robustness. Finally, we study the effect of network architectures on adversarial sensitivity. To do this, we use neural architecture search with reinforcement learning to find adversarially robust architectures on CIFAR10. Our resulting architecture is more robust to white and black box attacks compared to previous attempts.

The notion of adversarial attacks on image classification models based on convolutional neural networks (CNN) is introduced in this work. To classify images, deep learning models called CNNs are frequently used. However, when the networks are subject to adversarial attacks, extremely potent and previously trained CNN models that perform quite effectively on image datasets for image classification tasks may perform poorly. In this work, one well-known adversarial attack known as the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) is explored and its adverse effects on the performances of image classification models are examined. The FGSM attack is simulated on three pre-trained image classifier CNN architectures, ResNet-101, AlexNet, and RegNetY 400MF using randomly chosen images from the ImageNet dataset. The classification accuracies of the models are computed in the absence and presence of the attack to demonstrate the detrimental effect of the attack on the performances of the classifiers. Finally, a mechanism is proposed to defend against the FGSM attack based on a modified defensive distillation-based approach. Extensive results are presented for the validation of the proposed scheme.

While it has long been empirically observed that adversarial robustness may be at odds with standard accuracy and may have further disparate impacts on different classes, it remains an open question to what extent such observations hold and how the class imbalance plays a role within. In this paper, we attempt to understand this question of accuracy disparity by taking a closer look at linear classifiers under a Gaussian mixture model. We decompose the impact of adversarial robustness into two parts: an inherent effect that will degrade the standard accuracy on all classes due to the robustness constraint, and the other caused by the class imbalance ratio, which will increase the accuracy disparity compared to standard training. Furthermore, we also show that such effects extend beyond the Gaussian mixture model, by generalizing our data model to the general family of stable distributions. More specifically, we demonstrate that while the constraint of adversarial robustness consistently degrades the standard accuracy in the balanced class setting, the class imbalance ratio plays a fundamentally different role in accuracy disparity compared to the Gaussian case, due to the heavy tail of the stable distribution. We additionally perform experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets to corroborate our theoretical findings. Our empirical results also suggest that the implications may extend to nonlinear models over real-world datasets. Our code is publicly available on GitHub at https://github.com/Accuracy-Disparity/AT-on-AD.

Physical adversarial examples for camera-based computer vision have so far been achieved through visible artifacts -- a sticker on a Stop sign, colorful borders around eyeglasses or a 3D printed object with a colorful texture. An implicit assumption here is that the perturbations must be visible so that a camera can sense them. By contrast, we contribute a procedure to generate, for the first time, physical adversarial examples that are invisible to human eyes. Rather than modifying the victim object with visible artifacts, we modify light that illuminates the object. We demonstrate how an attacker can craft a modulated light signal that adversarially illuminates a scene and causes targeted misclassifications on a state-of-the-art ImageNet deep learning model. Concretely, we exploit the radiometric rolling shutter effect in commodity cameras to create precise striping patterns that appear on images. To human eyes, it appears like the object is illuminated, but the camera creates an image with stripes that will cause ML models to output the attacker-desired classification. We conduct a range of simulation and physical experiments with LEDs, demonstrating targeted attack rates up to 84%.

In autonomous driving (AD), accurate perception is indispensable to achieving safe and secure driving. Due to its safety-criticality, the security of AD perception has been widely studied. Among different attacks on AD perception, the physical adversarial object evasion attacks are especially severe. However, we find that all existing literature only evaluates their attack effect at the targeted AI component level but not at the system level, i.e., with the entire system semantics and context such as the full AD pipeline. Thereby, this raises a critical research question: can these existing researches effectively achieve system-level attack effects (e.g., traffic rule violations) in the real-world AD context? In this work, we conduct the first measurement study on whether and how effectively the existing designs can lead to system-level effects, especially for the STOP sign-evasion attacks due to their popularity and severity. Our evaluation results show that all the representative prior works cannot achieve any system-level effects. We observe two design limitations in the prior works: 1) physical model-inconsistent object size distribution in pixel sampling and 2) lack of vehicle plant model and AD system model consideration. Then, we propose SysAdv, a novel system-driven attack design in the AD context and our evaluation results show that the system-level effects can be significantly improved, i.e., the violation rate increases by around 70%.

Deep neural networks have been widely used in many critical applications, such as autonomous vehicles and medical diagnosis. However, their security is threatened by backdoor attacks, which are achieved by adding artificial patterns to specific training data. Existing defense strategies primarily focus on using reverse engineering to reproduce the backdoor trigger generated by attackers and subsequently repair the DNN model by adding the trigger into inputs and fine-tuning the model with ground-truth labels. However, once the trigger generated by the attackers is complex and invisible, the defender cannot reproduce the trigger successfully then the DNN model will not be repaired, as the trigger is not effectively removed. In this work, we propose Adversarial Feature Map Pruning for Backdoor (FMP) to mitigate backdoor from the DNN. Unlike existing defense strategies, which focus on reproducing backdoor triggers, FMP attempts to prune backdoor feature maps, which are trained to extract backdoor information from inputs. After pruning these backdoor feature maps, FMP will fine-tune the model with a secure subset of training data. Our experiments demonstrate that, compared to existing defense strategies, FMP can effectively reduce the Attack Success Rate (ASR) even against the most complex and invisible attack triggers (e.g., FMP decreases the ASR to 2.86\% in CIFAR10, which is 19.2\% to 65.41\% lower than baselines). Second, unlike conventional defense methods that tend to exhibit low robust accuracy (that is, the accuracy of the model on poisoned data), FMP achieves a higher RA, indicating its superiority in maintaining model performance while mitigating the effects of backdoor attacks (e.g., FMP obtains 87.40\% RA in CIFAR10). Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/retsuh-bqw/FMP.

Metaverse expands the physical world to a new dimension, and the physical environment and Metaverse environment can be directly connected and entered. Voice is an indispensable communication medium in the real world and Metaverse. Fusion of the voice with environment effects is important for user immersion in Metaverse. In this paper, we proposed using the voice conversion based method for the conversion of target environment effect speech. The proposed method was named MetaSpeech, which introduces an environment effect module containing an effect extractor to extract the environment information and an effect encoder to encode the environment effect condition, in which gradient reversal layer was used for adversarial training to keep the speech content and speaker information while disentangling the environmental effects. From the experiment results on the public dataset of LJSpeech with four environment effects, the proposed model could complete the specific environment effect conversion and outperforms the baseline methods from the voice conversion task.

A photo captured with bokeh effect often means objects in focus are sharp while the out-of-focus areas are all blurred. DSLR can easily render this kind of effect naturally. However, due to the limitation of sensors, smartphones cannot capture images with depth-of-field effects directly. In this paper, we propose a novel generator called Glass-Net, which generates bokeh images not relying on complex hardware. Meanwhile, the GAN-based method and perceptual loss are combined for rendering a realistic bokeh effect in the stage of finetuning the model. Moreover, Instance Normalization(IN) is reimplemented in our network, which ensures our tflite model with IN can be accelerated on smartphone GPU. Experiments show that our method is able to render a high-quality bokeh effect and process one 1024 times 1536 pixel image in 1.9 seconds on all smartphone chipsets. This approach ranked First in AIM 2020 Rendering Realistic Bokeh Challenge Track 1 \& Track 2.

Current adversarial attacks on motion estimation, or optical flow, optimize small per-pixel perturbations, which are unlikely to appear in the real world. In contrast, adverse weather conditions constitute a much more realistic threat scenario. Hence, in this work, we present a novel attack on motion estimation that exploits adversarially optimized particles to mimic weather effects like snowflakes, rain streaks or fog clouds. At the core of our attack framework is a differentiable particle rendering system that integrates particles (i) consistently over multiple time steps (ii) into the 3D space (iii) with a photo-realistic appearance. Through optimization, we obtain adversarial weather that significantly impacts the motion estimation. Surprisingly, methods that previously showed good robustness towards small per-pixel perturbations are particularly vulnerable to adversarial weather. At the same time, augmenting the training with non-optimized weather increases a method's robustness towards weather effects and improves generalizability at almost no additional cost. Our code will be available at https://github.com/cv-stuttgart/DistractingDownpour.

While state-of-the-art diffusion models (DMs) excel in image generation, concerns regarding their security persist. Earlier research highlighted DMs' vulnerability to data poisoning attacks, but these studies placed stricter requirements than conventional methods like `BadNets' in image classification. This is because the art necessitates modifications to the diffusion training and sampling procedures. Unlike the prior work, we investigate whether BadNets-like data poisoning methods can directly degrade the generation by DMs. In other words, if only the training dataset is contaminated (without manipulating the diffusion process), how will this affect the performance of learned DMs? In this setting, we uncover bilateral data poisoning effects that not only serve an adversarial purpose (compromising the functionality of DMs) but also offer a defensive advantage (which can be leveraged for defense in classification tasks against poisoning attacks). We show that a BadNets-like data poisoning attack remains effective in DMs for producing incorrect images (misaligned with the intended text conditions). Meanwhile, poisoned DMs exhibit an increased ratio of triggers, a phenomenon we refer to as `trigger amplification', among the generated images. This insight can be then used to enhance the detection of poisoned training data. In addition, even under a low poisoning ratio, studying the poisoning effects of DMs is also valuable for designing robust image classifiers against such attacks. Last but not least, we establish a meaningful linkage between data poisoning and the phenomenon of data replications by exploring DMs' inherent data memorization tendencies.

This study probes the vulnerabilities of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) under adversarial attacks, a critical determinant of c-MARL's worst-case performance prior to real-world implementation. Current observation-based attacks, constrained by white-box assumptions, overlook c-MARL's complex multi-agent interactions and cooperative objectives, resulting in impractical and limited attack capabilities. To address these shortcomes, we propose Adversarial Minority Influence (AMI), a practical and strong for c-MARL. AMI is a practical black-box attack and can be launched without knowing victim parameters. AMI is also strong by considering the complex multi-agent interaction and the cooperative goal of agents, enabling a single adversarial agent to unilaterally misleads majority victims to form targeted worst-case cooperation. This mirrors minority influence phenomena in social psychology. To achieve maximum deviation in victim policies under complex agent-wise interactions, our unilateral attack aims to characterize and maximize the impact of the adversary on the victims. This is achieved by adapting a unilateral agent-wise relation metric derived from mutual information, thereby mitigating the adverse effects of victim influence on the adversary. To lead the victims into a jointly detrimental scenario, our targeted attack deceives victims into a long-term, cooperatively harmful situation by guiding each victim towards a specific target, determined through a trial-and-error process executed by a reinforcement learning agent. Through AMI, we achieve the first successful attack against real-world robot swarms and effectively fool agents in simulated environments into collectively worst-case scenarios, including Starcraft II and Multi-agent Mujoco. The source code and demonstrations can be found at: https://github.com/DIG-Beihang/AMI.

Arabic text-to-speech (TTS) remains challenging due to limited resources and complex phonological patterns. We present reproducible baselines for Arabic TTS built on the FastPitch architecture and introduce cepstral-domain metrics for analyzing oversmoothing in mel-spectrogram prediction. While traditional Lp reconstruction losses yield smooth but over-averaged outputs, the proposed metrics reveal their temporal and spectral effects throughout training. To address this, we incorporate a lightweight adversarial spectrogram loss, which trains stably and substantially reduces oversmoothing. We further explore multi-speaker Arabic TTS by augmenting FastPitch with synthetic voices generated using XTTSv2, resulting in improved prosodic diversity without loss of stability. The code, pretrained models, and training recipes are publicly available at: https://github.com/nipponjo/tts-arabic-pytorch.

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) for 3D point cloud recognition are vulnerable to adversarial examples, threatening their practical deployment. Despite the many research endeavors have been made to tackle this issue in recent years, the diversity of adversarial examples on 3D point clouds makes them more challenging to defend against than those on 2D images. For examples, attackers can generate adversarial examples by adding, shifting, or removing points. Consequently, existing defense strategies are hard to counter unseen point cloud adversarial examples. In this paper, we first establish a comprehensive, and rigorous point cloud adversarial robustness benchmark to evaluate adversarial robustness, which can provide a detailed understanding of the effects of the defense and attack methods. We then collect existing defense tricks in point cloud adversarial defenses and then perform extensive and systematic experiments to identify an effective combination of these tricks. Furthermore, we propose a hybrid training augmentation methods that consider various types of point cloud adversarial examples to adversarial training, significantly improving the adversarial robustness. By combining these tricks, we construct a more robust defense framework achieving an average accuracy of 83.45\% against various attacks, demonstrating its capability to enabling robust learners. Our codebase are open-sourced on: https://github.com/qiufan319/benchmark_pc_attack.git.

Many methods have been proposed for removing batch effects and aligning single-cell RNA (scRNA) datasets. However, performance is typically evaluated based on multiple parameters and few datasets, creating challenges in assessing which method is best for aligning data at scale. Here, we introduce the K-Neighbors Intersection (KNI) score, a single score that both penalizes batch effects and measures accuracy at cross-dataset cell-type label prediction alongside carefully curated small (scMARK) and large (scREF) benchmarks comprising 11 and 46 human scRNA studies respectively, where we have standardized author labels. Using the KNI score, we evaluate and optimize approaches for cross-dataset single-cell RNA integration. We introduce Batch Adversarial single-cell Variational Inference (BA-scVI), as a new variant of scVI that uses adversarial training to penalize batch-effects in the encoder and decoder, and show this approach outperforms other methods. In the resulting aligned space, we find that the granularity of cell-type groupings is conserved, supporting the notion that whole-organism cell-type maps can be created by a single model without loss of information.

Vision Transformers are increasingly embedded in industrial systems due to their superior performance, but their memory and power requirements make deploying them to edge devices a challenging task. Hence, model compression techniques are now widely used to deploy models on edge devices as they decrease the resource requirements and make model inference very fast and efficient. But their reliability and robustness from a security perspective is another major issue in safety-critical applications. Adversarial attacks are like optical illusions for ML algorithms and they can severely impact the accuracy and reliability of models. In this work we investigate the transferability of adversarial samples across the SOTA Vision Transformer models across 3 SOTA compressed versions and infer the effects different compression techniques have on adversarial attacks.

Understanding predictions made by deep neural networks is notoriously difficult, but also crucial to their dissemination. As all machine learning based methods, they are as good as their training data, and can also capture unwanted biases. While there are tools that can help understand whether such biases exist, they do not distinguish between correlation and causation, and might be ill-suited for text-based models and for reasoning about high level language concepts. A key problem of estimating the causal effect of a concept of interest on a given model is that this estimation requires the generation of counterfactual examples, which is challenging with existing generation technology. To bridge that gap, we propose CausaLM, a framework for producing causal model explanations using counterfactual language representation models. Our approach is based on fine-tuning of deep contextualized embedding models with auxiliary adversarial tasks derived from the causal graph of the problem. Concretely, we show that by carefully choosing auxiliary adversarial pre-training tasks, language representation models such as BERT can effectively learn a counterfactual representation for a given concept of interest, and be used to estimate its true causal effect on model performance. A byproduct of our method is a language representation model that is unaffected by the tested concept, which can be useful in mitigating unwanted bias ingrained in the data.

Existing customization methods require access to multiple reference examples to align pre-trained diffusion probabilistic models (DPMs) with user-provided concepts. This paper aims to address the challenge of DPM customization when the only available supervision is a differentiable metric defined on the generated contents. Since the sampling procedure of DPMs involves recursive calls to the denoising UNet, na\"ive gradient backpropagation requires storing the intermediate states of all iterations, resulting in extremely high memory consumption. To overcome this issue, we propose a novel method AdjointDPM, which first generates new samples from diffusion models by solving the corresponding probability-flow ODEs. It then uses the adjoint sensitivity method to backpropagate the gradients of the loss to the models' parameters (including conditioning signals, network weights, and initial noises) by solving another augmented ODE. To reduce numerical errors in both the forward generation and gradient backpropagation processes, we further reparameterize the probability-flow ODE and augmented ODE as simple non-stiff ODEs using exponential integration. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of AdjointDPM on three interesting tasks: converting visual effects into identification text embeddings, finetuning DPMs for specific types of stylization, and optimizing initial noise to generate adversarial samples for security auditing.

Innovations in annotation methodology have been a catalyst for Reading Comprehension (RC) datasets and models. One recent trend to challenge current RC models is to involve a model in the annotation process: humans create questions adversarially, such that the model fails to answer them correctly. In this work we investigate this annotation methodology and apply it in three different settings, collecting a total of 36,000 samples with progressively stronger models in the annotation loop. This allows us to explore questions such as the reproducibility of the adversarial effect, transfer from data collected with varying model-in-the-loop strengths, and generalisation to data collected without a model. We find that training on adversarially collected samples leads to strong generalisation to non-adversarially collected datasets, yet with progressive performance deterioration with increasingly stronger models-in-the-loop. Furthermore, we find that stronger models can still learn from datasets collected with substantially weaker models-in-the-loop. When trained on data collected with a BiDAF model in the loop, RoBERTa achieves 39.9F1 on questions that it cannot answer when trained on SQuAD - only marginally lower than when trained on data collected using RoBERTa itself (41.0F1).

Large Language Models (LLMs) have led to significant improvements in many tasks across various domains, such as code interpretation, response generation, and ambiguity handling. These LLMs, however, when upgrading, primarily prioritize enhancing user experience while neglecting security, privacy, and safety implications. Consequently, unintended vulnerabilities or biases can be introduced. Previous studies have predominantly focused on specific versions of the models and disregard the potential emergence of new attack vectors targeting the updated versions. Through the lens of adversarial examples within the in-context learning framework, this longitudinal study addresses this gap by conducting a comprehensive assessment of the robustness of successive versions of LLMs, vis-\`a-vis GPT-3.5. We conduct extensive experiments to analyze and understand the impact of the robustness in two distinct learning categories: zero-shot learning and few-shot learning. Our findings indicate that, in comparison to earlier versions of LLMs, the updated versions do not exhibit the anticipated level of robustness against adversarial attacks. In addition, our study emphasizes the increased effectiveness of synergized adversarial queries in most zero-shot learning and few-shot learning cases. We hope that our study can lead to a more refined assessment of the robustness of LLMs over time and provide valuable insights of these models for both developers and users.

We investigate conditional adversarial networks as a general-purpose solution to image-to-image translation problems. These networks not only learn the mapping from input image to output image, but also learn a loss function to train this mapping. This makes it possible to apply the same generic approach to problems that traditionally would require very different loss formulations. We demonstrate that this approach is effective at synthesizing photos from label maps, reconstructing objects from edge maps, and colorizing images, among other tasks. Indeed, since the release of the pix2pix software associated with this paper, a large number of internet users (many of them artists) have posted their own experiments with our system, further demonstrating its wide applicability and ease of adoption without the need for parameter tweaking. As a community, we no longer hand-engineer our mapping functions, and this work suggests we can achieve reasonable results without hand-engineering our loss functions either.

Model distillation has become essential for creating smaller, deployable language models that retain larger system capabilities. However, widespread deployment raises concerns about resilience to adversarial manipulation. This paper investigates vulnerability of distilled models to adversarial injection of biased content during training. We demonstrate that adversaries can inject subtle biases into teacher models through minimal data poisoning, which propagates to student models and becomes significantly amplified. We propose two propagation modes: Untargeted Propagation, where bias affects multiple tasks, and Targeted Propagation, focusing on specific tasks while maintaining normal behavior elsewhere. With only 25 poisoned samples (0.25% poisoning rate), student models generate biased responses 76.9% of the time in targeted scenarios - higher than 69.4% in teacher models. For untargeted propagation, adversarial bias appears 6x-29x more frequently in student models on unseen tasks. We validate findings across six bias types (targeted advertisements, phishing links, narrative manipulations, insecure coding practices), various distillation methods, and different modalities spanning text and code generation. Our evaluation reveals shortcomings in current defenses - perplexity filtering, bias detection systems, and LLM-based autorater frameworks - against these attacks. Results expose significant security vulnerabilities in distilled models, highlighting need for specialized safeguards. We propose practical design principles for building effective adversarial bias mitigation strategies.

Vision-language models (VLMs) have significantly advanced autonomous driving (AD) by enhancing reasoning capabilities. However, these models remain highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. While existing research has primarily focused on general VLM attacks, the development of attacks tailored to the safety-critical AD context has been largely overlooked. In this paper, we take the first step toward designing adversarial attacks specifically targeting VLMs in AD, exposing the substantial risks these attacks pose within this critical domain. We identify two unique challenges for effective adversarial attacks on AD VLMs: the variability of textual instructions and the time-series nature of visual scenarios. To this end, we propose ADvLM, the first visual adversarial attack framework specifically designed for VLMs in AD. Our framework introduces Semantic-Invariant Induction, which uses a large language model to create a diverse prompt library of textual instructions with consistent semantic content, guided by semantic entropy. Building on this, we introduce Scenario-Associated Enhancement, an approach where attention mechanisms select key frames and perspectives within driving scenarios to optimize adversarial perturbations that generalize across the entire scenario. Extensive experiments on several AD VLMs over multiple benchmarks show that ADvLM achieves state-of-the-art attack effectiveness. Moreover, real-world attack studies further validate its applicability and potential in practice.

Graph neural network (GNN), as a powerful representation learning model on graph data, attracts much attention across various disciplines. However, recent studies show that GNN is vulnerable to adversarial attacks. How to make GNN more robust? What are the key vulnerabilities in GNN? How to address the vulnerabilities and defense GNN against the adversarial attacks? In this paper, we propose DefNet, an effective adversarial defense framework for GNNs. In particular, we first investigate the latent vulnerabilities in every layer of GNNs and propose corresponding strategies including dual-stage aggregation and bottleneck perceptron. Then, to cope with the scarcity of training data, we propose an adversarial contrastive learning method to train the GNN in a conditional GAN manner by leveraging the high-level graph representation. Extensive experiments on three public datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of DefNet in improving the robustness of popular GNN variants, such as Graph Convolutional Network and GraphSAGE, under various types of adversarial attacks.

As Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training (CLIP) models are increasingly adopted for diverse downstream tasks and integrated into large vision-language models (VLMs), their susceptibility to adversarial perturbations has emerged as a critical concern. In this work, we introduce X-Transfer, a novel attack method that exposes a universal adversarial vulnerability in CLIP. X-Transfer generates a Universal Adversarial Perturbation (UAP) capable of deceiving various CLIP encoders and downstream VLMs across different samples, tasks, and domains. We refer to this property as super transferability--a single perturbation achieving cross-data, cross-domain, cross-model, and cross-task adversarial transferability simultaneously. This is achieved through surrogate scaling, a key innovation of our approach. Unlike existing methods that rely on fixed surrogate models, which are computationally intensive to scale, X-Transfer employs an efficient surrogate scaling strategy that dynamically selects a small subset of suitable surrogates from a large search space. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that X-Transfer significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art UAP methods, establishing a new benchmark for adversarial transferability across CLIP models. The code is publicly available in our https://github.com/HanxunH/XTransferBench{GitHub repository}.

The study on improving the robustness of deep neural networks against adversarial examples grows rapidly in recent years. Among them, adversarial training is the most promising one, which flattens the input loss landscape (loss change with respect to input) via training on adversarially perturbed examples. However, how the widely used weight loss landscape (loss change with respect to weight) performs in adversarial training is rarely explored. In this paper, we investigate the weight loss landscape from a new perspective, and identify a clear correlation between the flatness of weight loss landscape and robust generalization gap. Several well-recognized adversarial training improvements, such as early stopping, designing new objective functions, or leveraging unlabeled data, all implicitly flatten the weight loss landscape. Based on these observations, we propose a simple yet effective Adversarial Weight Perturbation (AWP) to explicitly regularize the flatness of weight loss landscape, forming a double-perturbation mechanism in the adversarial training framework that adversarially perturbs both inputs and weights. Extensive experiments demonstrate that AWP indeed brings flatter weight loss landscape and can be easily incorporated into various existing adversarial training methods to further boost their adversarial robustness.

Deep learning is found to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. However, its adversarial susceptibility in image caption generation is under-explored. We study adversarial examples for vision and language models, which typically adopt an encoder-decoder framework consisting of two major components: a Convolutional Neural Network (i.e., CNN) for image feature extraction and a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) for caption generation. In particular, we investigate attacks on the visual encoder's hidden layer that is fed to the subsequent recurrent network. The existing methods either attack the classification layer of the visual encoder or they back-propagate the gradients from the language model. In contrast, we propose a GAN-based algorithm for crafting adversarial examples for neural image captioning that mimics the internal representation of the CNN such that the resulting deep features of the input image enable a controlled incorrect caption generation through the recurrent network. Our contribution provides new insights for understanding adversarial attacks on vision systems with language component. The proposed method employs two strategies for a comprehensive evaluation. The first examines if a neural image captioning system can be misled to output targeted image captions. The second analyzes the possibility of keywords into the predicted captions. Experiments show that our algorithm can craft effective adversarial images based on the CNN hidden layers to fool captioning framework. Moreover, we discover the proposed attack to be highly transferable. Our work leads to new robustness implications for neural image captioning.

Latent Diffusion Model (LDM) achieves state-of-the-art performances in image generation yet raising copyright and privacy concerns. Adversarial attacks on LDM are then born to protect unauthorized images from being used in LDM-driven few-shot generation. However, these attacks suffer from moderate performance and excessive computational cost, especially in GPU memory. In this paper, we propose an effective adversarial attack on LDM that shows superior performance against state-of-the-art few-shot generation pipeline of LDM, for example, LoRA. We implement the attack with memory efficiency by introducing several mechanisms and decrease the memory cost of the attack to less than 6GB, which allows individual users to run the attack on a majority of consumer GPUs. Our proposed attack can be a practical tool for people facing the copyright and privacy risk brought by LDM to protect themselves.

In today's era, where large language models (LLMs) are integrated into numerous real-world applications, ensuring their safety and robustness is crucial for responsible AI usage. Automated red-teaming methods play a key role in this process by generating adversarial attacks to identify and mitigate potential vulnerabilities in these models. However, existing methods often struggle with slow performance, limited categorical diversity, and high resource demands. While Rainbow Teaming, a recent approach, addresses the diversity challenge by framing adversarial prompt generation as a quality-diversity search, it remains slow and requires a large fine-tuned mutator for optimal performance. To overcome these limitations, we propose Ferret, a novel approach that builds upon Rainbow Teaming by generating multiple adversarial prompt mutations per iteration and using a scoring function to rank and select the most effective adversarial prompt. We explore various scoring functions, including reward models, Llama Guard, and LLM-as-a-judge, to rank adversarial mutations based on their potential harm to improve the efficiency of the search for harmful mutations. Our results demonstrate that Ferret, utilizing a reward model as a scoring function, improves the overall attack success rate (ASR) to 95%, which is 46% higher than Rainbow Teaming. Additionally, Ferret reduces the time needed to achieve a 90% ASR by 15.2% compared to the baseline and generates adversarial prompts that are transferable i.e. effective on other LLMs of larger size. Our codes are available at https://github.com/declare-lab/ferret.

Although weakly-supervised techniques can reduce the labeling effort, it is unclear whether a saliency model trained with weakly-supervised data (e.g., point annotation) can achieve the equivalent performance of its fully-supervised version. This paper attempts to answer this unexplored question by proving a hypothesis: there is a point-labeled dataset where saliency models trained on it can achieve equivalent performance when trained on the densely annotated dataset. To prove this conjecture, we proposed a novel yet effective adversarial trajectory-ensemble active learning (ATAL). Our contributions are three-fold: 1) Our proposed adversarial attack triggering uncertainty can conquer the overconfidence of existing active learning methods and accurately locate these uncertain pixels. {2)} Our proposed trajectory-ensemble uncertainty estimation method maintains the advantages of the ensemble networks while significantly reducing the computational cost. {3)} Our proposed relationship-aware diversity sampling algorithm can conquer oversampling while boosting performance. Experimental results show that our ATAL can find such a point-labeled dataset, where a saliency model trained on it obtained 97% -- 99% performance of its fully-supervised version with only ten annotated points per image.

Recent advancements in Text-to-Image (T2I) models have raised significant safety concerns about their potential misuse for generating inappropriate or Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) contents, despite existing countermeasures such as NSFW classifiers or model fine-tuning for inappropriate concept removal. Addressing this challenge, our study unveils GuardT2I, a novel moderation framework that adopts a generative approach to enhance T2I models' robustness against adversarial prompts. Instead of making a binary classification, GuardT2I utilizes a Large Language Model (LLM) to conditionally transform text guidance embeddings within the T2I models into natural language for effective adversarial prompt detection, without compromising the models' inherent performance. Our extensive experiments reveal that GuardT2I outperforms leading commercial solutions like OpenAI-Moderation and Microsoft Azure Moderator by a significant margin across diverse adversarial scenarios. Our framework is available at https://github.com/cure-lab/GuardT2I.

Adversarial Training (AT) with Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) is an effective approach for improving the robustness of the deep neural networks. However, PGD AT has been shown to suffer from two main limitations: i) high computational cost, and ii) extreme overfitting during training that leads to reduction in model generalization. While the effect of factors such as model capacity and scale of training data on adversarial robustness have been extensively studied, little attention has been paid to the effect of a very important parameter in every network optimization on adversarial robustness: the learning rate. In particular, we hypothesize that effective learning rate scheduling during adversarial training can significantly reduce the overfitting issue, to a degree where one does not even need to adversarially train a model from scratch but can instead simply adversarially fine-tune a pre-trained model. Motivated by this hypothesis, we propose a simple yet very effective adversarial fine-tuning approach based on a slow start, fast decay learning rate scheduling strategy which not only significantly decreases computational cost required, but also greatly improves the accuracy and robustness of a deep neural network. Experimental results show that the proposed adversarial fine-tuning approach outperforms the state-of-the-art methods on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet datasets in both test accuracy and the robustness, while reducing the computational cost by 8-10times. Furthermore, a very important benefit of the proposed adversarial fine-tuning approach is that it enables the ability to improve the robustness of any pre-trained deep neural network without needing to train the model from scratch, which to the best of the authors' knowledge has not been previously demonstrated in research literature.

Large language models (LLMs) are expected to follow instructions from users and engage in conversations. Techniques to enhance LLMs' instruction-following capabilities typically fine-tune them using data structured according to a predefined chat template. Although chat templates are shown to be effective in optimizing LLM performance, their impact on safety alignment of LLMs has been less understood, which is crucial for deploying LLMs safely at scale. In this paper, we investigate how chat templates affect safety alignment of LLMs. We identify a common vulnerability, named ChatBug, that is introduced by chat templates. Our key insight to identify ChatBug is that the chat templates provide a rigid format that need to be followed by LLMs, but not by users. Hence, a malicious user may not necessarily follow the chat template when prompting LLMs. Instead, malicious users could leverage their knowledge of the chat template and accordingly craft their prompts to bypass safety alignments of LLMs. We develop two attacks to exploit the ChatBug vulnerability. We demonstrate that a malicious user can exploit the ChatBug vulnerability of eight state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs and effectively elicit unintended responses from these models. Moreover, we show that ChatBug can be exploited by existing jailbreak attacks to enhance their attack success rates. We investigate potential countermeasures to ChatBug. Our results show that while adversarial training effectively mitigates the ChatBug vulnerability, the victim model incurs significant performance degradation. These results highlight the trade-off between safety alignment and helpfulness. Developing new methods for instruction tuning to balance this trade-off is an open and critical direction for future research

Decision-based adversarial attacks construct inputs that fool a machine-learning model into making targeted mispredictions by making only hard-label queries. For the most part, these attacks have been applied directly to isolated neural network models. However, in practice, machine learning models are just a component of a much larger system. By adding just a single preprocessor in front of a classifier, we find that state-of-the-art query-based attacks are as much as seven times less effective at attacking a prediction pipeline than attacking the machine learning model alone. Hence, attacks that are unaware of this invariance inevitably waste a large number of queries to re-discover or overcome it. We, therefore, develop techniques to first reverse-engineer the preprocessor and then use this extracted information to attack the end-to-end system. Our extraction method requires only a few hundred queries to learn the preprocessors used by most publicly available model pipelines, and our preprocessor-aware attacks recover the same efficacy as just attacking the model alone. The code can be found at https://github.com/google-research/preprocessor-aware-black-box-attack.

Adversarial testing of large language models (LLMs) is crucial for their safe and responsible deployment. We introduce a novel approach for automated generation of adversarial evaluation datasets to test the safety of LLM generations on new downstream applications. We call it AI-assisted Red-Teaming (AART) - an automated alternative to current manual red-teaming efforts. AART offers a data generation and augmentation pipeline of reusable and customizable recipes that reduce human effort significantly and enable integration of adversarial testing earlier in new product development. AART generates evaluation datasets with high diversity of content characteristics critical for effective adversarial testing (e.g. sensitive and harmful concepts, specific to a wide range of cultural and geographic regions and application scenarios). The data generation is steered by AI-assisted recipes to define, scope and prioritize diversity within the application context. This feeds into a structured LLM-generation process that scales up evaluation priorities. Compared to some state-of-the-art tools, AART shows promising results in terms of concept coverage and data quality.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems enhance large language models by incorporating external knowledge, addressing issues like outdated internal knowledge and hallucination. However, their reliance on external knowledge bases makes them vulnerable to corpus poisoning attacks, where adversarial passages can be injected to manipulate retrieval results. Existing methods for crafting such passages, such as random token replacement or training inversion models, are often slow and computationally expensive, requiring either access to retriever's gradients or large computational resources. To address these limitations, we propose Dynamic Importance-Guided Genetic Algorithm (DIGA), an efficient black-box method that leverages two key properties of retrievers: insensitivity to token order and bias towards influential tokens. By focusing on these characteristics, DIGA dynamically adjusts its genetic operations to generate effective adversarial passages with significantly reduced time and memory usage. Our experimental evaluation shows that DIGA achieves superior efficiency and scalability compared to existing methods, while maintaining comparable or better attack success rates across multiple datasets.

We present a novel approach for attacking black-box large language models (LLMs) by exploiting their ability to express confidence in natural language. Existing black-box attacks require either access to continuous model outputs like logits or confidence scores (which are rarely available in practice), or rely on proxy signals from other models. Instead, we demonstrate how to prompt LLMs to express their internal confidence in a way that is sufficiently calibrated to enable effective adversarial optimization. We apply our general method to three attack scenarios: adversarial examples for vision-LLMs, jailbreaks and prompt injections. Our attacks successfully generate malicious inputs against systems that only expose textual outputs, thereby dramatically expanding the attack surface for deployed LLMs. We further find that better and larger models exhibit superior calibration when expressing confidence, creating a concerning security paradox where model capability improvements directly enhance vulnerability. Our code is available at this [link](https://github.com/zj-jayzhang/black_box_llm_optimization).

Many deployed learned models are black boxes: given input, returns output. Internal information about the model, such as the architecture, optimisation procedure, or training data, is not disclosed explicitly as it might contain proprietary information or make the system more vulnerable. This work shows that such attributes of neural networks can be exposed from a sequence of queries. This has multiple implications. On the one hand, our work exposes the vulnerability of black-box neural networks to different types of attacks -- we show that the revealed internal information helps generate more effective adversarial examples against the black box model. On the other hand, this technique can be used for better protection of private content from automatic recognition models using adversarial examples. Our paper suggests that it is actually hard to draw a line between white box and black box models.

We design, implement, and evaluate adversarial decoding, a new, generic text generation technique that produces readable documents for different adversarial objectives. Prior methods either produce easily detectable gibberish, or cannot handle objectives that include embedding similarity. In particular, they only work for direct attacks (such as jailbreaking) and cannot produce adversarial text for realistic indirect injection, e.g., documents that (1) are retrieved in RAG systems in response to broad classes of queries, and also (2) adversarially influence subsequent generation. We also show that fluency (low perplexity) is not sufficient to evade filtering. We measure the effectiveness of adversarial decoding for different objectives, including RAG poisoning, jailbreaking, and evasion of defensive filters, and demonstrate that it outperforms existing methods while producing readable adversarial documents.

Recently, Diffusion Models (DMs) boost a wave in AI for Art yet raise new copyright concerns, where infringers benefit from using unauthorized paintings to train DMs to generate novel paintings in a similar style. To address these emerging copyright violations, in this paper, we are the first to explore and propose to utilize adversarial examples for DMs to protect human-created artworks. Specifically, we first build a theoretical framework to define and evaluate the adversarial examples for DMs. Then, based on this framework, we design a novel algorithm, named AdvDM, which exploits a Monte-Carlo estimation of adversarial examples for DMs by optimizing upon different latent variables sampled from the reverse process of DMs. Extensive experiments show that the generated adversarial examples can effectively hinder DMs from extracting their features. Therefore, our method can be a powerful tool for human artists to protect their copyright against infringers equipped with DM-based AI-for-Art applications. The code of our method is available on GitHub: https://github.com/mist-project/mist.git.

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that add malicious tokens to an input prompt to bypass the safety guardrails of an LLM and cause it to produce harmful content. In this work, we introduce erase-and-check, the first framework for defending against adversarial prompts with certifiable safety guarantees. Given a prompt, our procedure erases tokens individually and inspects the resulting subsequences using a safety filter. Our safety certificate guarantees that harmful prompts are not mislabeled as safe due to an adversarial attack up to a certain size. We implement the safety filter in two ways, using Llama 2 and DistilBERT, and compare the performance of erase-and-check for the two cases. We defend against three attack modes: i) adversarial suffix, where an adversarial sequence is appended at the end of a harmful prompt; ii) adversarial insertion, where the adversarial sequence is inserted anywhere in the middle of the prompt; and iii) adversarial infusion, where adversarial tokens are inserted at arbitrary positions in the prompt, not necessarily as a contiguous block. Our experimental results demonstrate that this procedure can obtain strong certified safety guarantees on harmful prompts while maintaining good empirical performance on safe prompts. Additionally, we propose three efficient empirical defenses: i) RandEC, a randomized subsampling version of erase-and-check; ii) GreedyEC, which greedily erases tokens that maximize the softmax score of the harmful class; and iii) GradEC, which uses gradient information to optimize tokens to erase. We demonstrate their effectiveness against adversarial prompts generated by the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack algorithm. The code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/aounon/certified-llm-safety.

Machine learning models, especially deep neural networks (DNNs), have been shown to be vulnerable against adversarial examples which are carefully crafted samples with a small magnitude of the perturbation. Such adversarial perturbations are usually restricted by bounding their L_p norm such that they are imperceptible, and thus many current defenses can exploit this property to reduce their adversarial impact. In this paper, we instead introduce "unrestricted" perturbations that manipulate semantically meaningful image-based visual descriptors - color and texture - in order to generate effective and photorealistic adversarial examples. We show that these semantically aware perturbations are effective against JPEG compression, feature squeezing and adversarially trained model. We also show that the proposed methods can effectively be applied to both image classification and image captioning tasks on complex datasets such as ImageNet and MSCOCO. In addition, we conduct comprehensive user studies to show that our generated semantic adversarial examples are photorealistic to humans despite large magnitude perturbations when compared to other attacks.

Adversarial purification is a defense mechanism for safeguarding classifiers against adversarial attacks without knowing the type of attacks or training of the classifier. These techniques characterize and eliminate adversarial perturbations from the attacked inputs, aiming to restore purified samples that retain similarity to the initially attacked ones and are correctly classified by the classifier. Due to the inherent challenges associated with characterizing noise perturbations for discrete inputs, adversarial text purification has been relatively unexplored. In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of adversarial purification methods in defending text classifiers. We propose a novel adversarial text purification that harnesses the generative capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) to purify adversarial text without the need to explicitly characterize the discrete noise perturbations. We utilize prompt engineering to exploit LLMs for recovering the purified examples for given adversarial examples such that they are semantically similar and correctly classified. Our proposed method demonstrates remarkable performance over various classifiers, improving their accuracy under the attack by over 65% on average.

In motion generation, controllability as well as generation quality and speed is becoming more and more important. There are various motion editing tasks, such as in-betweening, upper body editing, and path-following, but existing methods perform motion editing with a data-space diffusion model, which is slow in inference compared to a latent diffusion model. In this paper, we propose MoLA, which provides fast and high-quality motion generation and also can deal with multiple editing tasks in a single framework. For high-quality and fast generation, we employ a variational autoencoder and latent diffusion model, and improve the performance with adversarial training. In addition, we apply a training-free guided generation framework to achieve various editing tasks with motion control inputs. We quantitatively show the effectiveness of adversarial learning in text-to-motion generation, and demonstrate the applicability of our editing framework to multiple editing tasks in the motion domain.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are widely used in vision-language reasoning tasks. However, their vulnerability to adversarial prompts remains a serious concern, as safety mechanisms often fail to prevent the generation of harmful outputs. Although recent jailbreak strategies report high success rates, many responses classified as "successful" are actually benign, vague, or unrelated to the intended malicious goal. This mismatch suggests that current evaluation standards may overestimate the effectiveness of such attacks. To address this issue, we introduce a four-axis evaluation framework that considers input on-topicness, input out-of-distribution (OOD) intensity, output harmfulness, and output refusal rate. This framework identifies truly effective jailbreaks. In a substantial empirical study, we reveal a structural trade-off: highly on-topic prompts are frequently blocked by safety filters, whereas those that are too OOD often evade detection but fail to produce harmful content. However, prompts that balance relevance and novelty are more likely to evade filters and trigger dangerous output. Building on this insight, we develop a recursive rewriting strategy called Balanced Structural Decomposition (BSD). The approach restructures malicious prompts into semantically aligned sub-tasks, while introducing subtle OOD signals and visual cues that make the inputs harder to detect. BSD was tested across 13 commercial and open-source MLLMs, where it consistently led to higher attack success rates, more harmful outputs, and fewer refusals. Compared to previous methods, it improves success rates by 67% and harmfulness by 21%, revealing a previously underappreciated weakness in current multimodal safety systems.

In this work, we leverage visual prompting (VP) to improve adversarial robustness of a fixed, pre-trained model at testing time. Compared to conventional adversarial defenses, VP allows us to design universal (i.e., data-agnostic) input prompting templates, which have plug-and-play capabilities at testing time to achieve desired model performance without introducing much computation overhead. Although VP has been successfully applied to improving model generalization, it remains elusive whether and how it can be used to defend against adversarial attacks. We investigate this problem and show that the vanilla VP approach is not effective in adversarial defense since a universal input prompt lacks the capacity for robust learning against sample-specific adversarial perturbations. To circumvent it, we propose a new VP method, termed Class-wise Adversarial Visual Prompting (C-AVP), to generate class-wise visual prompts so as to not only leverage the strengths of ensemble prompts but also optimize their interrelations to improve model robustness. Our experiments show that C-AVP outperforms the conventional VP method, with 2.1X standard accuracy gain and 2X robust accuracy gain. Compared to classical test-time defenses, C-AVP also yields a 42X inference time speedup.

Despite recent efforts in Large Language Models (LLMs) safety and alignment, current adversarial attacks on frontier LLMs are still able to force harmful generations consistently. Although adversarial training has been widely studied and shown to significantly improve the robustness of traditional machine learning models, its strengths and weaknesses in the context of LLMs are less understood. Specifically, while existing discrete adversarial attacks are effective at producing harmful content, training LLMs with concrete adversarial prompts is often computationally expensive, leading to reliance on continuous relaxations. As these relaxations do not correspond to discrete input tokens, such latent training methods often leave models vulnerable to a diverse set of discrete attacks. In this work, we aim to bridge this gap by introducing MixAT, a novel method that combines stronger discrete and faster continuous attacks during training. We rigorously evaluate MixAT across a wide spectrum of state-of-the-art attacks, proposing the At Least One Attack Success Rate (ALO-ASR) metric to capture the worst-case vulnerability of models. We show MixAT achieves substantially better robustness (ALO-ASR < 20%) compared to prior defenses (ALO-ASR > 50%), while maintaining a runtime comparable to methods based on continuous relaxations. We further analyze MixAT in realistic deployment settings, exploring how chat templates, quantization, low-rank adapters, and temperature affect both adversarial training and evaluation, revealing additional blind spots in current methodologies. Our results demonstrate that MixAT's discrete-continuous defense offers a principled and superior robustness-accuracy tradeoff with minimal computational overhead, highlighting its promise for building safer LLMs. We provide our code and models at https://github.com/insait-institute/MixAT.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown exceptional results on current benchmarks when working individually. The advancement in their capabilities, along with a reduction in parameter size and inference times, has facilitated the use of these models as agents, enabling interactions among multiple models to execute complex tasks. Such collaborations offer several advantages, including the use of specialized models (e.g. coding), improved confidence through multiple computations, and enhanced divergent thinking, leading to more diverse outputs. Thus, the collaborative use of language models is expected to grow significantly in the coming years. In this work, we evaluate the behavior of a network of models collaborating through debate under the influence of an adversary. We introduce pertinent metrics to assess the adversary's effectiveness, focusing on system accuracy and model agreement. Our findings highlight the importance of a model's persuasive ability in influencing others. Additionally, we explore inference-time methods to generate more compelling arguments and evaluate the potential of prompt-based mitigation as a defensive strategy.

Adversarial purification with diffusion models has emerged as a promising defense strategy, but existing methods typically rely on uniform noise injection, which indiscriminately perturbs all frequencies, corrupting semantic structures and undermining robustness. Our empirical study reveals that adversarial perturbations are not uniformly distributed: they are predominantly concentrated in high-frequency regions, with heterogeneous magnitude intensity patterns that vary across frequencies and attack types. Motivated by this observation, we introduce MANI-Pure, a magnitude-adaptive purification framework that leverages the magnitude spectrum of inputs to guide the purification process. Instead of injecting homogeneous noise, MANI-Pure adaptively applies heterogeneous, frequency-targeted noise, effectively suppressing adversarial perturbations in fragile high-frequency, low-magnitude bands while preserving semantically critical low-frequency content. Extensive experiments on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-1K validate the effectiveness of MANI-Pure. It narrows the clean accuracy gap to within 0.59 of the original classifier, while boosting robust accuracy by 2.15, and achieves the top-1 robust accuracy on the RobustBench leaderboard, surpassing the previous state-of-the-art method.

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) incidents stemming from the exploitation of smart contract vulnerabilities have culminated in financial damages exceeding 3 billion US dollars. Existing defense mechanisms typically focus on detecting and reacting to malicious transactions executed by attackers that target victim contracts. However, with the emergence of private transaction pools where transactions are sent directly to miners without first appearing in public mempools, current detection tools face significant challenges in identifying attack activities effectively. Based on the fact that most attack logic rely on deploying one or more intermediate smart contracts as supporting components to the exploitation of victim contracts, in this paper, we propose a new direction for detecting DeFi attacks that focuses on identifying adversarial contracts instead of adversarial transactions. Our approach allows us to leverage common attack patterns, code semantics and intrinsic characteristics found in malicious smart contracts to build the LookAhead system based on Machine Learning (ML) classifiers and a transformer model that is able to effectively distinguish adversarial contracts from benign ones, and make just-in-time predictions of potential zero-day attacks. Our contributions are three-fold: First, we construct a comprehensive dataset consisting of features extracted and constructed from recent contracts deployed on the Ethereum and BSC blockchains. Secondly, we design a condensed representation of smart contract programs called Pruned Semantic-Control Flow Tokenization (PSCFT) and use it to train a combination of ML models that understand the behaviour of malicious codes based on function calls, control flows and other pattern-conforming features. Lastly, we provide the complete implementation of LookAhead and the evaluation of its performance metrics for detecting adversarial contracts.